Economic Power as a Geopolitical Tool

Economic power has, since the dawn of civilization, been a foundation of the nation state’s standing amongst its neighbors. Indeed economic activity and in particular trade with neighboring nations is a fundamental element of society as we know it, from small tribal villages to the WTO. Thus the ability to wield trade and economic dependency as a tool of both soft power in times of peace or the erosion of war fighting capacity in times of conflict is something that has been an essential part foreign policy for time immemorial. Today in times of relative geo-political stability and an established security order, gaining economic leverage in order to achieve strategic results is becoming the favorite weapon of the world’s great rising powers. The state owned mega-corporations Gazprom of Russia and Chinalco of China have become the long arms of their respective owners, implementing policy of not only economic benefit but geo-strategic division and long term disruption of the established security order. Apparently in the world of a lone superpower and a single dominant alliance system “economic warfare” has become new great power battleground, and in a globalized economy it is fast becoming one of the most challenging.


Russia, Gazprom and West


Russia is perhaps in the unique position as the only contemporary ex superpower in existence. Just two short decades ago the Soviet Union enjoyed the most powerful conventional military forces on the planet, with the economic and political influence that enjoyed hegemonic domination over half the globe. Thus it may seem to be a bit of a paradox to label Russia as a rising power. Certainly the short period of time spent out of the superpower league stands in stark contrast to the other rising powers such as China and India, neither of which have ever enjoyed true great power status on a global scale. However Russia’s geo-strategic situation today shares much in common with India or China, and the old Bear is desperate to shake off the daemons of the 1990’s and reassert her position alongside the other global powers. Unable to challenge the west militarily, Russia has turned to economic leverage as a tool to challenge NATO’s eastward expansion into Russia’s cold war sphere of influence. In addition to the rapid economic growth these moves have provided, the policy of economic “divide and conquer” is clearly visible in the Russian Government and Gazprom’s actions over the last five years.


Gazprom was created during the last days of the Soviet Union as a state run natural gas ministry, which soon became a state owned company and Russia’s largest energy producer. Privatized during the frantic and chaotic reforms initiated by Boris Yeltsin, Gazprom appeared to be on the path to western style privatization, albeit with strict ownership controls. The company posted a loss in 1999 amid controversy over internal accounting policies and a deteriorating natural gas transportation system. During the Putin administration’s reign Gazprom was effectively nationalized with the government obtaining a controlling share under the guise reducing restrictions on share ownership criteria. Gazprom moved quickly to tap into the vast western markets the thawing of the cold war had opened up, and in the blossoming of east west economic relationships Gazprom positioned itself as the primary natural gas supplier to the EU, with cheap abundant reserves and several overland pipelines. The relationship fostered between the growing EU and Gazprom was initially quite productive, with little Russian government interference or apparent politicization of management.


Only after the Russian government gained a controlling share in Gazprom was Putin able to effectively wield the massive economic power the energy relationship with Europe provided. By 2006 Gazprom provided most the natural gas to eastern Europe and a significant share to Germany and France, and while it remained in Russia’s economic interest to not allow anything to disrupt the relationship, the economic dependency on an authoritarian and increasingly assertive Russia was not something that sat easily with many Europeans, and it was in a dispute with Belarus that Russia began to flex her economic muscles.


During the 1990’s Russia continued her subsidization of eastern European gas supplies, leading to a huge price disparity between gas sold to Western Europe and the former Soviet block. In 2006 Russia signaled an abrupt shift to this policy by tripling the price it demanded from Belarus per cubic meter of gas, although this level was still far below what western Europeans played. A longstanding dispute over oil erupted between the two nations, with Belarus imposing a tariff on oil transited to Western Europe. Belarus may have been the instigator of this dispute; however the action taken by Russia was both drastic and far reaching. Initially Gazprom threatened to cut off all Natural Gas flowing through Belarus, which entailed a significant impact for the rest of Europe situated downstream. On January 8 2007, Russia actually cut off oil supplies running through Belarus. This was the first indication that Russia would use its monopoly over supply to achieve strategic results and capitulation by a smaller power. However worse was to come, and the economic battlefield would be in the Ukraine.


A very similar story ran its course in the Ukraine. Long enjoying subsidized natural gas prices, in 2006 the Ukraine was faced with a similar price hike. In the resulting dispute Gazprom stopped supplies moving through Ukraine, leaving much of eastern and central Europe without heating in the grips of winter. The Russians claimed that Ukrainian companies had been siphoning gas out of the pipeline that was intended for other European customers. Whether or not this is the case the Russian reaction was telling and dramatic, a dispute with the Ukraine led to severe economic and personal pain for Eastern Europe and its people. Russia demonstrated to Europe that it would not hesitate to cut off hydrocarbon supplies over a rather minor economic dispute with the Ukraine. Eastern Europe awoke to the reality that its massive dependence on Russian natural gas supplies was akin to an economic sword of Damocles hanging, now rather precariously, over their heads.


To make things worse in August of 2008 Russia invaded her neighbor in the South Caucuses, Georgia, with the pretext of Georgian aggression in its breakaway province of South Ossetia. This action had two primary consequences for Eastern and Central Europe;

1. Russia demonstrated that it could mount significant military campaigns within the former soviet union, (with almost no justification), and the west would do nothing of value to help.
   
2. The only other major natural gas supply diversification option for Eastern Europe is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). This multinational pipeline project is designed to connect the central Asian Hydrocarbon fields to the European market, without passing through Russian territory. With no other feasible Natural Gas supplies and no immediate alternatives to natural gas, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (and to a smaller extent Central Europe) have a choice between several Russian pipelines or the South Caucasus Pipeline. However the SCP passes through Georgia on its way from the Caspian to the Black Sea, terminating on the black sea port of Supsa. Currently the SCP only transports oil however a natural Gas component is planned. SCP infrastructure was heavily targeted by Russian air power during the conflict, severely degrading the emplaced infrastructure.
   

Thus, although the August war failed to bring a Russian friendly regime to power in Tibilisi (which would have given Moscow control of the SCP by proxy), the Russians both demonstrated their ability to interdict the only other major pipeline system in operation in Eastern Europe, with only a minimal pretext and without direct western intervention (and disrupted the pipeline already in place). Now Eastern and Central Europe are faced with the situation that a strategically critical energy supply are controlled virtually by a single power, one that has demonstrated its ability and intent to disrupt energy supplies under its direct control for political reasons, and use military force to interdict diversification options. In short, Eastern Europe’s (and to a lesser extent Central Europe’s) energy security is dependant on the prevailing mood in the Kremlin.


The strategic implications of this economic dependency are fourfold:

1. Hydrocarbon supplies provide Moscow with a lever that can be used to apply pressure on Eastern Europe very effectively, a geographical region that Moscow sees as vital to its future security. It is a primary strategic objective for Moscow to push her influence as far west as possible due to the lack of a geographical anchor for her borders on the North European plane.
2. The partial dependency of major European powers such as Germany on Russian natural gas buys Moscow more room to maneuver in the former Soviet Union. If Moscow plans on any other military operations in Central Asia or the Caucasus the Germans and Eastern Europeans will be less willing to press the issue, lest their energy supplies be jeopardized. Neither the Germans nor the Eastern Europeans will be likely to get significantly involved either politically, economically or militarily if Russia were to repeat the war with Georgia elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Thus this increases the Russians military options before it meets serious resistance from the Europeans. Germans are unlikely to go cold over Turkmenistan or Tajikistan.
3. Given the above point, European energy dependence goes to achieving another Russian strategic objective, the destabilization of NATO. As Russia continues to reassert itself in the former Soviet Union the Anglo-Saxon powers are sure to resist, however its the central European powers with something to loose and very little to gain from confronting Russia in central Europe or the Caucuses. Although a Central Asian conflict would not affect NATO directly, the difference in policy response between the continental European powers and the Anglo-Saxon block will. If the Russians apply pressure in far eastern Europe and the Baltic states Germany will also be less inclined to intervene than the Anglo Saxon block, and that could cause a significant rift (there are more reasons than energy security for Germany’s apathy towards another confrontation with Russia).
4. Energy supplies provide Russia with the ability to destabilize the current regime in Kiev. The Ukraine is strategically vital to Russia, and Russia proper would be nye indefensible if the Ukraine was allowed to join a western alliance. Thus destabilization and eventual overthrow of the current pro western regime in Kiev is an immediate strategic objective for Moscow, and the use of energy supplies provides a very powerful lever as it dramatically effects the lives of every day Ukrainians.
   

Clearly the use of economic levers has become the primary mechanism used by Moscow to achieve strategic goals in Eastern Europe, in addition to providing the political space to allow more direct methods to be utilized.


China, Chinalco and Australia


The Peoples Republic of China (PROC) and the Commonwealth of Australia have enjoyed a long standing and mutually beneficial economic partnership for almost 30 years. The massive Chinese economic expansion that has been driven by cheap exports to western markets has funded a massive industrialization process. Driven by a massive need for raw materials, PROC looked for a partner who could assure regular supply in a geographically location. Australia fit the bill perfectly. The economic boom that the world enjoyed in the first 8 years of this century drove Chinese expansion at a dizzying pace, which pushed commodity prices to all time highs. River’s of Chinese money flowed into Canberra’s coffers as incredibly profitable commodity contracts supercharged the Australian economy, with sustained 4.5% Real GDP growth rates. By 2008 the Australian GDP reached the $1AUD trillion mark. Although the mining sector only account for ~5% of Australia’s GDP, the massive profitability of commodity contracts meant that the multiplier effect of these exports was significantly enhanced.


This burgeoning economic relationship had significant strategic implications however. Since world war two Australia has been closely aligned with the U.S., the latter being Australia’s ultimate security guarantor. Australia is part of the “ABC” alliance group, meaning Australia, Britain & Canada. This “Anglo-Saxon block” is the U.S.’ closet alliance structure, receiving privileged technology transfer and intelligence sharing opportunities. Australia is one of two key US allies in the Asia Pacific region, anchoring the US’ southern flank in the region with Japan in the north. These two alliances are the cornerstone of the US position in the western pacific, with two modern, wealthy, dynamic, competent and capable partners at the north and south ends of Asia. This alliance system provides the US with the ability not only to geographically dominate the entire pacific but act as the geographical anchor to any containment strategy for rising East Asian powers.


The US-Aus alliance is why China’s economic relationship with Australia is important on a strategic level. Ever since Australia realigned from strategic dependency on the UK to the US its economic interests have not been aligned with its security relationships. Prior to 1939, the single largest market for Australian exports was the UK and its empire in the Indian Ocean basin. Thus retaining access to markets in the UK was economically vital to Australia, and why it deployed very large forces (per capita) to defend the Suez Canal in both world war one and world war two. Australia’s primary security partner, the UK, was also its largest economic partner. However once Australia’s principle security partner became the US its economic interests diverged from its security interests. Australia is a recourse exporter, so is the US. Thus the guarantor of its security is also an economic competitor.


Now Australia’s largest export markets are no longer British dominions but Japan and China, the great Asian product exporters. The relationship with Japan is strategically benign because Japan and Australia are part of the same alliance system. The relationship with china has the potential to be destabilizing however, simply because the US and China are competitors. From a security viewpoint, Australia has become the southern anchor to the US’s containment of China. The Australian sphere of influence (Indonesia, Papua New Guinea & Oceania), which is becoming more pronounced as Australia’s national power continues to grow, acts as natural buffer for growing Chinese influence. Wherever China seeks security and economic relationships within Australia’s sphere of influence it will find already standing and long established security, political and economic relationships with Australia as the regions leading power. Additionally Australia provides the US a secure base to interdict the Melaka Straights and conduct operations in South East Asia in the event of a shooting war with China. Thus the Australian alliance is very valuable to Washington. Conversely Australia has far more to gain economically from China than it does from the US. This contradiction between Australia’s security and economic relationships is a significant vulnerability in the U.S’s alliance system, particularly as that economic relationship continues to grow.


And it has been growing of late. After the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the global recession that followed many Australian mining companies have been experiencing significant financial difficulties, primarily due to the inability of some firms to find adequate credit in the post Lehman Brothers credit environment, and also due to the collapse in commodity prices. Seeing an opportunity to increase economic influence in Australia, and improve their market position various state owned Chinese mineral companies have either invested in or attempted to invest in Australian mining companies. An example is the $1.2 Billion AUD purchase of OzMinerals’ mining facilities in South Australia by the Chinese government owned MinMetals. The largest economic move by Beijing was the proposed $19.5 Billion USD investment in Rio Tinto by Chinese recourse giant Chinalco (also state owned). If the deal had gone through it would have given Chinalco a significant market advantage, considering Rio Tinto and Chinalco enjoy a customer/supplier relationship. Economically the investment would have been a very good one for Chinalco and PROC, from that point on Chinalco’s bargaining position would have been far stronger during contract negotiations, and Rio would have been effectively locked into the Chinalco relationship. However Rio walked away from the deal after strong public and shareholder opposition to the proposal, it is possible that the Australian government could have vetoed the deal on national interest grounds.


While the Chinalco deal made great economic sense to the Chinese it also served significant strategic interests. Increasing economic ties between China and Australia, while improving the Chinese position in the relationship simultaneously, increases the potential for dissention within the US’ political alliance structure. Let me qualify this, if there was a major, multi theatre regional conflict between the two powers it is inconceivable that Australia would not enter on the side of its closest ally with its full capability.


However that is not the most likely conflict scenario in East Asia. In a small and limited conflict over Taiwan, after the cessation of hostilities (and likely Chinese defeat) China and the U.S would have powerful economic incentives to return to reasonably amicable relations. Without the US market Chinese exports will have to destination (a disastrous outcome for the Chinese Communist party and the nations territorial integrity), and the US will loose mountains of Chinese investment and cheap imports. Thus the symbiotic and critical economic relationship they have will compel both sides to resume semi-normal economic interaction almost immediately. China would not be in a position to punish the US economically (they have more to loose). However Australia is much more vulnerable. Although hardly crippling economically, the loss of Chinese export contracts would have significant and tangible effects on GDP and employment in Australia. It is likely that the extremely profitability of the recourse sector has been responsible for the above trend growth seen in the last 10 years. This could amount to between $5 billion AUD and $10 billion AUD p.a. at current prices when the multiplier effect is considered, at the upper end almost half to Australia’s aggregate defence spend. For a conflict in which no vital Australian interests are at stake, Australia would pay a heavy price for its involvement in the defence of Taiwan.


Therefore it is likely that the US may not count on military assistance from one of its closest allies in a high intensity conflict against an able foe in their geographical area. It is at least reasonable to assume hesitation on Canberra’s part to enter the conflict, considering the cost. Deepening this relationship means widening the gap between Australia’s security interests and its economic interest, which will increase the possibility that Australia will not intervene in a conflict over Taiwan and not peruse as committed a containment strategy as would have been the case other wise.


Conclusions

Clearly the massive government owned enterprises in the two potentially antagonistic rising global powers are being used as instruments of state power, and although the use is typically more obvious in the case of Russia, both nations are perusing wider geostrategic goals. Of course this phenomenon is not limited to rising powers; the west has been using similar tactics for decades. The US effectively controls the global trade system through global naval domination, and has the ability to exclude any nation from free global trade. When it exercises this power it is usually through U.N. sanctions, however only the USN has the ability to enforce sanctions on a global scale.


However this is usually a use of military force under a UN banner, the west rarely uses economic dependence of potential enemies in the manner Moscow and Beijing do. This is a dramatic shift from the cold war, where the eastern and western blocks were totally economically independent, with very little economic interaction between the two. In the new era of globalization and the global economy, economic interaction provides significant opportunities for traditional geopolitical maneuvers which would have been backed by military force in the past. In real terms Russia posses very little threat to Germany, but through Natural Gas supply manipulation Russia has the ability to move Berlin’s position. Additionally China posses very little realistic threat militarily to Australia, particularly an Australia what is part of the US block, however with the ability to turn off the tap of Chinese money Beijing has the ability to heavily influence policy in Canberra. Of course that does not suggest Russia can invade Poland without a German reaction, or China can establish naval bases or launch amphibious campaigns in Indonesia or Papua without an Australian militarily reaction, nevertheless it does afford them more options.


Additionally it must be said that the economic relationship between Gazprom and Eastern Europe or Chinalco and Australia has been initiated with the objective of providing government with an economic lever. Russia had Natural Gas, Europe needed it, Australia had minerals, and China needed them. However these state owned corporations are instruments of state power, make no mistake. And while perusing economic objectives, geopolitical objectives can also be achieved.


These consequences of economic interaction must be assessed by policymakers when economic decisions are made. Global economics is now a battlefield between the major global power blocks, in a way it has never been before. This is clearly a consequence of the massive military inferiority any power has under the US, and another asymmetrical form of exercising state power.

Power Projection in the Twenty First Century: Lessons to be learned?

Throughout history governments have required the ability to project both hard and soft power well beyond their borders, and almost without exception naval force has been the most capable power projection tool available. Those same requirements still stand today. At the dawn of the twenty first century the nature of naval power projection and the equipment and doctrine needed to achieve it stand at somewhat of a crossroads, with the assumptions that have underpinned western naval procurement for the last twenty years undergoing extensive reexamination. The threat matrix facing western navies is now evolving rapidly, and naval strategists and procurement planners are racing to catch up. Was the “littoral centric” procurement program launched by the USN warranted given the evolving nature of naval power projection and the rise of potential blue water competitors? Is the RAN justified in investing so much in amphibious capability and assets to protect it while relatively neglecting offensive counter maritime and strike assets? In this article I will examine both the USN’s and the RAN’s procurement choices as both strive to adapt to the changing requirements of naval power projection in the twenty first century.

The USN and the Littoral Environment

The end of the cold war left the USN without the primary set of strategic requirements that had dominated procurement and doctrine; the need to protect the Atlantic sea lines of communication. No longer did the USN have to devote massive resources to a large frigate force intended to escort convoys to Europe. Over night the threat matrix facing the USN and the organizations primary role dramatically altered, with the lone superpower now taking on the role of global peacemaker. However the US fleet was not properly equipped for this role, with a large destroyer and frigate fleet designed for blue water operations. If the USN was to be the White House’s “big stick” in far flung corners of the globe the massive blue water capability appeared to be largely redundant. It was assumed that only dominating the littorals would allow the USN military to intervene in, coerce or militarily dominate lesser powers in strategically vital but distant locations. With no apparent blue water challenger in the 1990’s the full focus of procurement and R&D shifted to green water capability.

This “littoral centric” view of procurement and doctrine that dominated the USN during the 1990’s is apparent in a wide range of programs: the conversion of Ohio class SSBN’s to SSGN’s, the Littoral Combat Ship program and the DD(X) program are perhaps the most well known. The only major blue water design and procurement program initiated in the 1990’s was the CVN(X) next generation carrier, and although DDG-51 procurement continued that program was thoroughly rooted in the cold war. Clearly the USN had relegated blue water capability to the “backburner” in terms of research, development and procurement.

The LCS is a small, fast, lightweight and inexpensive platform designed to operate effectively in the littoral environment. Its modular “mission package” system allows the LCS to perform a wide variety of roles with “plug in and fight” mission components giving it some blue water capability. The planned fifty five ship LCS fleet will be a vital component to the USN’s “313 ship navy” concept[1] and will allow the USN to operate with much greater flexibility in the littoral environment[2]. With a top speed in excess of forty knots the LCS is intended to move quickly into littoral environments dominated by smaller nations, deploy Special Forces, lay or hunt mines and provide small units deployed on shore with indirect fire support. The platform is optimized for this role with only minimal air defence capability and small ca

liber naval guns[3]. The only potential blue water capability this class will posses will be in the ASW role, with the ASW mission package and a deployed MH-60 providing a partial ability to prosecute SSN/K/G threat in deep water. Clearly the bulk of the blue water ASW load will be taken up by the DDG-51 fleet due to its significantly superior sensor suite and ASW weapons fit. The LCS will provide the USN with a level of flexibility and speed of response in the littoral environment that the FFG-7 or DDG-51 simply could not.

Left: LCS 1, Freedom Right: LCS 2 Independence

The other major development and procurement program currently underway is the DD(X) program and its product the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer. The DD(X) program was intended to fulfill the Marine Corps’ requirement for naval fire support which the USN lost when it retired the Iowa class battleships in the early 1990’s. The DDG-1000 is a littoral optimized vessel, with a dual band (X and S band) radar designed to track small targets in high clutter, in shore environments, significant Radar Cross Section reduction measures and the 155mm/6 inch Advanced Gun System, firing rocket assisted Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) Precision Guided Monition’s with a maximum range of 60nm[4]. While the DDG-1000 is a guided missile destroyer, it was never intended to fulfill the area air defence role that the DDG-51 fulfils today, which is a limitation in blue water scenarios. Additionally the DDG-1000’s sonar is heavily optimized for operating in the littoral environment. While the DDG-1000’s sensors, weapons, and RCS reduction will allow the platform to operate very effectively in well defended littoral environments, this optimization limits the platforms flexibility.

Left: DDG-1000 Right:DDG-51

The DDG-1000 has been one of the more controversial naval procurement program in modern times, attracting extensive attention from the Congressional Budget Office and the press. The many revolutionary aspects of the DDG-1000’s design, such as its significant RCS reduction measures and dual band radar, entail a hefty research and development price tag with a $6.6 Billion USD procurement cost for the first vessel. After years of staunch defence of the DDG-1000 program, before the Sea power and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee in July 2008, the USN announced that it no longer intended to procure any additional Zumwalt class destroyers past the three already funded but requested funding for an additional DDG-51 with the possibility of a further eight[5]. The Marine Corps consider the DDG-1000’s Naval Fire Support mission as critical, however the Navy contends that more than adequate fire support can be provided by airborne platforms, rocket assisted 5 inch munitions and organic marine fires. The USN sighted the increased blue water threats of air launched anti ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles defence and proliferation of blue water capable conventional submarines, and the DDG-1000’s deficiency when facing this altered threat matrix, as the major rational behind the decision to resume DDG-51 production.

The decision to “truncate” the DDG-1000 to 3 vessels and resume DDG-51 production is the first step away from a littoral centric mindset that has dominated USN strategic thinking for the last fifteen years. It seems that this dramatic about face was attributable to more than a proliferation of SSK’s and the increased need for BMD that had developed in the previous 2 years. Evidently the mid term threat to the USN’s dominance of the worlds blue water by the rise of new Asian powers has been a major factor in the platforms selection. The increased threat of ballistic missiles clearly refers to the significant strides continental Asian powers are making in converting these weapons for anti ship use. The massive investment in green water operations that are invariably asymmetric in nature and facing a lesser power, which the DDG-1000 represents, is clearly a “niche” expenditure that detracts from the USN’s blue water capability. Now with an increased threat to the USN’s ability to operate outside of the littorals procurement has shifted to more flexible platforms.

The RAN, the AWD and the “Fat Ships”

In 2007, Australia was the fifth largest user of commercial shipping in the world. The geographic circumstances and economic structure that Australia must contend with create an almost unparalleled reliance on Sea Lines of Communication and the economic link they provide. Thus the concept of sea control is a matter of economic life and death for RAN and ADF as a whole. The ability to control the areas of ocean that function as Australia’s economic link to the rest of the world, and if need be deny that to an enemy, may be Australia’s realistic centre of gravity in any major conflict. The long and bloody battle for Guadalcanal in 1942 was fought by the U.S. in order to maintain those vital links to her ally. However this need to defend commercial shipping routs in high intensity warfare has taken somewhat of a back seat in procurement programs in the last ten years, with a heavy emphasis on amphibious lift and power projection. While the RAN is not investing heavily in such specialized vessels as the LCS or DDG-1000, the emphasis is clearly on the more visible elements of maritime power projection such as extremely capable Air Warfare Destroyers and Large Amphibious Ships.

The need for an area air defence solution for the RAN was outlined under Project SEA 4000, the Air Warfare Destroyer program. The previous destroyer possessed by the RAN was the Perth (Charles F. Adams) class DDG which were approaching obsolescence at their 1990’s retirement date. The area air defence need was partially fulfilled by the Adelaide FFG-7 class guided missile frigate (Oliver Hazard Perry class) however this solution never replaced the capability lost with the Perth Class retirement in contemporary terms. The chosen design from the SEA 4000 project is an Australian derivative of the Spanish F-100 Alvaro de Bazan class frigate. Equipped with the SPY-1D(v) phased array radar and Aegis combat system, the F-100 will provide a true quantum leap for the RAN in terms of area air defence capability[6].

Left: The Hobart class AWD

The replacement of the LPA’s HMAS Kanibla and HMAS Manoora under Project JP 2048 phase 4a resulted in the selection of the largest vessels ever acquired for the RAN, the 27,000 ton Canberra Class LHD’s. Each of the Canberra class LHD’s will be capable of moving a mechanized battalion group, complete with M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, self propelled or towed artillery, Ground Based Air Defence units, combat engineers, signals companies and logistics assets in addition to a mixture of between ten to twenty four attack and lift helicopters. The ability to move a complete battalion group allows a single Canberra class LHD to deploy a fully sustainable, complete force well beyond Australian shores, a capability comparable to the RAN’s entire current sea lift capacity. The two ships will be able to deploy the best part of a fully equipped mechanized brigade.

Left: The Canberra class LHD

According the defence white paper published in 2000, the secondary and tertiary roles of the ADF in terms of strategic importance are the promotion of stability in the south pacific and Indonesia and the common defence of South-East Asia[7]. Both of these strategic requirements require the ability to project hard power away from Australian shores. These requirements, in addition to ongoing contributions to global security, are the driving strategic focus for the acquisition of the Canberra class LHD’s and Hobart class DDG’s. These platforms are intended to allow the ADF to deploy heavy forces around the south pacific quickly and effectively with adequate organic capability within the battalion group/brigade. The common defence of South East Asia could well see the deployment of a brigade in amphibious operations in the face of hostile air and anti ship cruise missile capability, requiring first tier area air defence provided by the Hobart class DDG’s. Clearly the primacy of the defence of Australia scenario that had dominated Australian thinking has been abandoned post 2000, as the major naval procurement initiatives launched in the first decade of the twenty first century are all tools of power projection.

Lessons to learn?

The dynamic nature of power projection and the strategic landscape has created an extremely challenging situation for naval strategist’s and procurement planners to contend with over the last fifteen years. The lack of a clear blue water threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ascension of the U.S. to the role of global policeman in the security vacuum that followed lead to a dramatically different set of operational requirements for the early twenty first century, a set of requirements not seen in modern history. No global contender to US naval capability and the need to operate in the littoral environment effectively when facing lesser, although often well armed powers in strategically vital locations. Such an emphasis on expeditionary warfare without a credible blue water threat is reminiscent of the Royal Navy’s role between the world wars.

The littoral centric mindset that seems to have gripped the USN is perhaps understandable given the organizational drive to evolve after the cold war. Post 1990 the USN would face small states in widely dispersed theatres, and in every case it would have the task of maintaining or restoring the established security order. The new operational environment drove the new operational paradigm, and the result is the littoral optimized vessels such as the DDG-1000 and LCS. These vessels are a reaction to a perceived strategic environment, and both will allow the USN to operate with virtual impunity in the littorals in the vast majority of scenarios. However the question remains as to why the USN is abandoning the DDG-1000 and acquiring previous generation DDG-51’s if these vessels are so well suited to the operational environment that the USN was bound to face in the post Cold War era?

The RAN faced a similar shift in its strategic landscape, but the collapse of the Soviet Union had little impact. The major shift in Australia was Canberra’s realization that the nations security did not just lay in ensuring any potential adversary could not operate freely in the northern approaches. Indeed the sea denial strategy that was utterly dominant in the late 1980’s and 1990’s still remains as the critical element to the defence of Australia; however it is now the option of last resort. The common defence of South East Asian friends and allies would likely be where any battle for Australia would be fought, and even though the use of friendly bases is assumed, the ability to deploy forces in the face of a credible air threat far from Australia becomes paramount. That capability, in addition to improved global reach, drove the acquisition of a world class air defence capability and massively increased amphibious capacity.

However this adaptation to an evolving strategic requirement may have been short sighted. The arguably myopic, fifteen to twenty year limited view held by the USN and RAN has lead to a situation, particularly in Washington, where procurement choices are racing to catch up with the evolving threat matrix, and falling back on legacy platforms to do so. After billions of dollars invested in what is undoubtedly the world’s most capable destroyer sized vessel the mighty DDG-1000 has been relegated to the abyss of a technology demonstrator. This is the price the USN is paying for its myopic focus on the littoral operational environment; the construction of legacy platforms because next generation systems are too optimized and inflexible to adapt to a changed threat matrix and strategic requirements. Undoubtedly the technology equipping the DDG-1000 is, on average, far more capable than that equipping the DDG-51; however the lack of blue water capability which could have easily been included in the design stage has rendered the platform virtually redundant. With only two options the USN has no choice but to continue production of previous gen platforms.

The ADF is in danger of repeating similar mistakes. The acquisition of an Aegis capability and the massive increase in sea lift will improve the RAN’s ability to project power globally, in line with the government’s requirements. However since the commissioning of the sixth Collins Class SSG there has been no real investment in counter maritime or ASW capability. The Hobart Class DDG’s will dramatically improve the RAN’s air defence potential, however the platforms maritime strike capacity is broadly capable to an ANZAC class FFH, and its ASW capability is not dramatically superior. The ADF’s single most capable maritime strike and ASW asset is without doubt the Collins class SSG, yet the government did not exercise its option for a further two platforms or begin construction of one or two vessels in the lag time between the completion of the final Collins and construction of the Hobart class DDG.

Left: The Collins class SSG

It seems the critical point that must be remembered is that sea control is a critical prerequisite for power projection[8]. The USN’s dogmatic adherence to littoral combat neglected investment in blue water capability; the ability to operate in the littoral environment is useless if you are challenged by an enemies attempt at a sea denial or sea control strategy out of the littorals. Sea control in blue water requires local superiority on, above and below the oceans, and that superiority is necessary for maritime forces to project power ashore. The ADF has apparently focused on only one element in the last ten years and missed an opportunity to significantly increase the RAN’s ability to dominate the other two. Although usually considered tools of a sea denial strategy, submarines can be extremely effective in a sea control strategy if used in conjunction with surface assets. The DDG-1000 could still have performed its littoral mission adequately if it had not been so heavily optimized for green water, the addition of proper blue water sonar, additional VLS and BMD capability would have allowed the US to continue with production of its next generation destroyer.

As we look towards our next round of procurement choices, such as the numbers of Hobart Class to be produced and the ANZAC and Collins class replacements, we must remember the lessons being learned at the moment. Procurement planners must look beyond the immediate strategic needs and not invest in heavily optimized platforms, in addition to making sure the platform choices match the strategic environment are designed to address. The question remains as to weather the lessons of twenty first century power projection have been learned.

---

[1] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and issues for Congress: Page 3.

[2] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Page 2.

[3] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Page 4.

[4] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Summary

[5] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs, Background, Oversight Issues and Options for Congress

[6] Australian Defence Business Review, Volume 25, July-August 2006, Page 18

[7] 2000 Defence White Paper, page 49

[8] Semaphore, Issue 9 2007, Royal Australian Navy

Air Power Australia, Flanker Analysis Examined

Unless you have stumbled across this blog by complete accident and are looking for financial commentary or a V8 page you’ve probably heard of Dr Carlo Kopp. Indeed he is perhaps the most famous, or infamous, analyst within the wider Australian defence community. The “good Dr” contributes to many respectable publications such as Defence Today Magazine on a regular basis, and often reports on a number of defence related issues which are in my opinion usually genuine and thoughtful articles. However his rather uncontroversial additions to various defence media are probably not the reason why you have heard of Dr Kopp. His most controversial articles and analysis all stem from the debate over the RAAF’s choice of combat aircraft and its viability when facing advanced Russian Flanker derivatives. His website “Air Power Australia” has flooded the internet with articles which invariably end with the conclusion on the outright inferiority of all western alternatives apart from the F-22A when facing the Super Flanker threat.

While the government went about considering tenders for an eventual replacement of the F/A-18C/D’s and F-111 fleet Dr Kopp and other associates (a Mr Goon included) lodged a submission to the DoD. Under Kopp’s plan the RAAF would acquire ~50 F-22A’s and retain 24 ‘upgraded’ F-111S’s. When this option was not chosen by the RAAF (the F-35 was chosen and then the F/A-18F as an interim solution) the Dr launched his PR campaign, arguing that only the F-22A could provide the RAAF with the necessary level of air dominance when facing the advanced Flanker threat. Soon the internet was flooded by APA PDF’s and his various pages on the APA site with long and seemingly comprehensive arguments illustrating the dire mistake the RAAF had made, and the inferiority of the chosen designs. To the layman (or even someone with a casual interest in air power) his arguments are very persuasive; indeed a younger, more impressionable Ozzy was swayed by the doctor’s conviction and apparent technical mastery. Debates on many forums included Kopp’s arguments, many of which had apparently not appeared before, it seemed that this Australian defence journalist had swayed thousands all over the world to his view of the contemporary battle space.

However after time, careful thought, significant discussion and a good dose of listening, reading and learning a slightly older, more sceptical Ozzy began to question the “good Dr’s” arguments and conclusions. Indeed it soon became apparent that Carlo Kopp’s work on contemporary air combat is, for the most part, an exercise in lobbying. After close examination it’s apparent that the vast majority of Dr Kopp’s arguments are based on mistruths, bogus analysis and conclusions drawn after only examining beneficial considerations. Below is the first section of a PDF authored by Dr Kopp available at his website, It is in many ways a typical piece of Kopp’s work which is why I decided to critically examine it. There was more to the piece but I could have gone on for ever; this two page article exemplifies Kopp’s major arguments and clearly illustrates the tactics and devices he uses to put together a persuasive and seemingly sound argument. Below I have outlined 16 major misrepresentations of fact, omissions, oversimplifications and deliberately partial analysis Kopp made on this 2 page journey in order to arrive at the damning conclusion that the F-35A or F/A-18F could at best, only hope to achieve parity when facing an advanced Flanker threat.

I have not altered the good doctor’s work outlined in blue below. The article full can be found here:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-BVR-AAM.html

Russian BVR Combat Philosophy

The Russian paradigm of BVR combat has its origins in the Cold War period, when Soviet operational analysis indicated that the low kill probability of missile seekers and airframes, especially if degraded by countermeasures, would be a major impediment to success. By the 1970s the standard Soviet technique in a BVR missile launch was to salvo two rounds, a semiactive radar homing weapon and a heatseeking weapon. To this effect some Soviet fighters even included a weapons select mode which automatically sequenced the launch of two rounds for optimal separation.

The mathematics of multiple round missile engagements are unambiguous - the size of a missile salvo launched is a stronger driver of success than the actual kill probability of the individual missiles. If the missiles are wholly identical by type, then the following curves may be optimistic, insofar as a factor degrading the kill probability of one missile is apt to have a similar effect on its siblings in a salvo. However, where the missiles differ by seeker type and guidance control laws, then the assumption of statistically independent missile shots is very much stronger.

A question often asked is why are Sukhoi Flanker variants equipped to carry between eight and twelve BVR missiles? The answer is a simple one - so they can fire more than one three or four round BVR missile salvo during the opening phases of an engagement. In this fashion the aircraft being targeted has a difficult problem as it must jam, decoy and/or outmanoeuvre three or four tightly spaced inbound missiles. Even if we assume a mediocre per round kill probability of 30 percent, a four round salvo still exceeds a total kill probability of 75 percent.

1) This all assumes the engagement occurs within the Flanker/R-27’s No Escape Zone/Volume which is unrealistic in most scenarios. The NEZ for an R-27ER vs. an F/A-18F with detection at launch would probably sit somewhere in the 30~40nm range mark, just over half of the stated maximum range of the R-27 and well under half of the AIM-120D’s maximum range. If the launch occurs outside this range then multiple launches will have no additional effect on the engagement, i.e. if the target can outrun one incoming then he can outrun 10.

A critical question which must be asked when assessing the effectiveness of Russian BVR tactics is that of Western tactics and the effectiveness of the AIM-120 AMRAAM, the principal Western BVR fighter weapon. The AIM-120A AMRAAM was introduced at the end of the Cold War to provide a "fire and forget" active radar guided weapon with a midcourse inertial guidance system and datalink support provided by the radar on the launch aircraft, allowing multiple concurrent shots. The AIM-120A was followed by the incrementally improved B-model, and then by the "short span" AIM-120C-3 sized to fit the F-22A weapon bay. The AIM-120C-4 has better kinematic performance introducing a larger rocket motor and shorter control section, and a better warhead, while the AIM-120C-6 introduced a better fuse. The latest AIM-120D introduces a redesigned seeker built for better durability in high vibration carriage environments, a two way datalink, GPS to supplement inertial guidance, incrementally improved kinematics, and better seeker performance against high off-boresight targets.

2) Kopp conveniently forgets to mention that the AIM-120D’s “multi burn” rocket motor has extended its maximum range to 100nm, 30nm greater reach than the R-27ER long burn. Additionally every stage in the AIM-120’s evolution has systematically improved its ECCM package, and even the AIM-120B included a home on jam feature rendering noise jamming (the type most widely used in the 90’s) obsolete.

The performance of the AIM-120A/B/C models in combat to date has not been spectacular. Test range trials have resulted in stated kill probabilities of 85 percent out of 214 launches for the AIM-120C variant. Combat statistics for all three variants are less stellar, amounting to, according to US sources, ten kills (including a friendly fire incident against a UH-60) of which six were genuine BVR shots, for the expenditure of just over a dozen AIM-120 rounds. The important parameter is that every single target was not equipped with a modern defensive electronic warfare package and therefore not representative of a state-of-the-art Flanker in a modern BVR engagement. Against such "soft" targets the AIM-120 has displayed a kill probability of less than 50 percent [1]. It is an open question whether the AIM-120D when challenged with a modern DRFM (Digital RF Memory) based monopulse trackbreaking jammer will be able to significantly exceed the 50 percent order of magnitude kill probability of prior combat launches, let alone replicate the 85 percent performance achieved in ideal test range conditions [2].

3) Here Dr Kopp mistakes average PK with an individual missile shot’s PK which is what is meant to be discussed here. An individual missile shot’s PK is utterly dependant on the details of the missile launch. These include range to target, altitude relative to target, energy state, target energy state, target bearing/angle of track, target ECM and the individual missiles ECCM. What this means in real terms is if an AIM-120D was fired at a supersonic MiG-21 at 90nm when the launch platform was in a low energy state and the target was fleeing the PK would be less than 5%. According to Kopp’s line of reason the AIM-120D must have a PK under 20%. Thus taking the total number of AIM-120 combat shots and taking the % of successes and then attempting to use those numbers as some sort of evidence for a particular missile shots probability of success is a fundamentally flawed line of logic in my opinion. In sub surface naval engagements, a low PK torpedo shot may be taken in order to facilitate a response from the enemy, such as to force him to come shallow or disrupt the enemies firing solution by compelling them to manoeuvre. The same stands for A2A engagements. Many A2A engagements in the 90’s occurred with western fighters defending strike packages, and escorting fighters may have made shots that had a low probability of success in order to defend the package. In short PK is not an arbitrary number, it’s wholly dependant on the circumstances of the launch. While some forms of SJP may have effected the PK of individual shots is not clear by any means that non state of the art SPJ’s would have had a significant effect considering the AMRAAM’s HOJ and ECCM package.

4) The AIM-120D has the most advanced ECCM package available on the BVR missile market to date. Modern DRFM deception jammers work by analysing the seekers pulse frequencies and then transmitting a similar signal in order to deceive the missile or reduce the seekers/FCR’s range through active cancellation. There are two fundamental vulnerabilities with this kind of technology. One is if you don’t understand the algorithms that govern the threat seekers actions and ECCM capability it may well be that the seeker will see the EM source attempting to jam it. The second is if that occurs then the SPJ acts like a beacon as the seeker just follows the EM source to the target. Thus deception jamming is extremely intel dependant, because if you don’t understand how the threat seeker works or how its “brain” thinks SPJ’s of this type can, in fact, be counter productive. The reality is even though this technology can be quite effective if it is more advanced than the seeker technology opposing it; it is far from the “panacea” portrayed by Kopp.

Where does this leave Western air forces equipped with the AIM-120 when confronting Flankers armed with up to three times the number of BVR missiles?

Illustrative examples are the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35 JSF, the latter armed in an air superiority configuration with two, the former with up to six AIM-120s [3]. Assuming the Flanker driver does not exploit his superior missile kinematic range and shoot first - an optimistic assumption - then the best case kill probability for the AIM-120 shooter firing two to four rounds is better than 90 percent. However, if we assume that hostile jamming and manoeuvre degrade the kill probability to around 50 percent - a reasonably optimistic statistical baseline here – then the total kill probability for a two round salvo is optimistically around 75 percent, and for a four round salvo over 90 percent. Arguably good odds for the four round salvo, only if the missile kill probability sits at 50 percent, but the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF will have expended all or most of its warload of AIM-120s and be unable to continue in BVR combat.

In a "many versus many" engagement, the low speed of both types leaves them unable to disengage and will see both types subsequently killed by another Flanker. This best case "many versus many" engagement scenario sees the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF being traded one for one with Su-30MK/Su-35BM Flankers in BVR combat, which is the general assumption made for WVR combat between like opponents, and representative of many historical attrition air campaign statistics. To achieve this best case "many versus many" outcome of trading F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF one for one, we have stacked a series of assumptions against the Flanker - dumb Flanker pilots not exploiting a missile kinematic range advantage, dumb Flanker pilots not exploiting a firepower advantage, Russian BVR missile seekers no better than the AIM-120, and Russian DRFM monopulse jammers achieving a less than 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability [4].

5) First let me address a clear misrepresentation of fact. The F/A-18F has 8 AMRAAM capable hard points. Additionally is has a dual rail launcher allowing the 6 underwing hard points to carry two each. Theoretically the platform could carry 14 AIM-120’s and 2 AIM-9X’s for a grand total of 16 missiles, significantly more than the SU-30. In real terms the two inboard hard points would likely be taken up by external fuel carriage, reducing the AMRAAM load to 10. 12 AAM’s is a realistic war load for the super hornet, though 10 is more typical (identical to a Flanker). At IOC the F-35A will be able to launch with 10 AMRAAM’s on 10 internal and external hard points if need be, and currently a dual rail, internal AMRAAM launcher is being developed under LM’s spiral development program which will allow 12; again comparable or better to a Flanker. In real terms there is no real advantage in a Flankers war load, and the Hornet/Lightning will be carrying weapons a full generation more advanced then their Russian adversaries.

Left and Right: F/A-18F with a 10 AAM missile load displaying the dual rail launcher, note that the outboard under-wing hard-points are not equipped with the dual rail launcher. Additionally the inboard under-wing hard-points are available for external fuel carriage making this an operational configuration.

6) The ability to achieve first shot is not dominated by kinematical performance in the vast majority of cases; information is the critical asset in this instance. The F/A-18F has significant RCS reduction in the frontal aspect, reducing its clean RCS to<.5m2 (likely .1m2). Even when carrying weapons the Rhino’s frontal RCS would be far smaller than a Flanker’s (SU-30’s frontal RCS is an estimated 4m2 + weapons). In real terms this will significantly reduce the flanker’s detection radius (although not to the level of VLO). Furthermore the F/A-18F is equipped with the AN/APG-79, LPI AESA radar. The exact detection and track performance of Irbis/BARS PESA and the APG-79 AESA radars are classified, but considering the generic performance bonuses AESA systems enjoy it is probable the AN/APG-79 provides better D&T performance. Additionally the LPI AESA’s random frequency modulation makes it extremely difficult to effectively jam; the system should enjoy much better ECCM performance than its Russian peers.

But even if the generationally inferior Russian radars enjoy comparable D&T performance the Rhino’s reduced RCS means it will detect the Flanker first. Furthermore the massive power output and single frequency use of the Russian super PESA’s means they will be detectable by the Rhino’s fully digital AN/ALR-67(v)3 RWR well outside said radars detection footprint. The combination of ESM/RWR detection, superior radar performance and smaller RCS ensures that in the vast majority of scenarios the Rhino will detect the Flanker first. First look is critical to enabling first shot (hence the term first look, first shot, first kill). Once you detect the threat without being counter detected the pilot can take the positional advantage or disengage at will, by achieving first look the Rhino enjoys the ability to prosecute the engagement on his own terms. Attaining positional advantage significantly increases the chances of a successful engagement; engaging the enemy while remaining undetected (outside of the threats radar footprint i.e. anywhere but in front of it) while in a high energy state and possibly from higher altitude will have devastating effects on the target.

Delaying the detection of the missile shot as long as possible increases the NEZ dramatically, gives the pilot less time to react and keeps end game energy high through lack of target evasion. First look has nothing to do with kinematical performance and everything to do with information dominance, the high ground in contemporary warfare and the dominating factor in modern BVR engagements. Considering the Super Hornet will most likely enjoy first look, and is equipped with BVR missiles that provide a 30% larger engagement envelope I think its reasonable to assume in most occasions the F/A-18F will achieve first shot, and again kinematic performance has little to do with it.

7) Flanker’s missiles are INFERIOR in terms of range performance. Longest ranging Russian missile equipping the flanker series in the foreseeable future is the R-27 Long Burn. This missile has a range maximum engagement envelope of 70nm (source Carlo Kopp). The F/A-18F on the other hand is equipped with the AIM-120D. That missile has a maximum engagement envelope of >100nm.

8) The F-35 is an LO platform with an RCS smaller than .001m2 (comparable to a golf ball or insect). Throughout the Flankers operational lifespan (and the foreseeable future) BVR engagements will be dominated by X band radars, just like those equipping the Flanker. Thus the Flanker will likely not have the ability to engage the F-35 in the BVR regime full stop, let alone achieve 1 for 1 kill rates in the 100km+ range (the F-35’s likely AIM-120D launch radius).

9) The R-77 is the Flankers primary active radar homing missile developed in the early 90’s, along with the R-27ER/EA which is in effect an R-27 missile body equipped with a long burn motor and the R-77’s seeker. The R-27ER/EA is the most potent missile in the Flankers inventory; however it enjoys identical seeker performance to the R-77. As we all know the driving force behind Russian weapons development in the post Cold War era has been the export market. Clearly the Russian arms manufactures have abandoned their previous qualms on exporting degraded or inferior Russian equipment. This is illustrated by the fact that the most capable Russian built fighters operational anywhere are flown by the Indian air force, and the export of top line Russian ASCM’s such as the “Sunburn”. Therefore it would be atypical for Russian manufacturers to have more advanced seeker technology in production and it not to be available on the open arms market. The R-77E (export model) has been available for export for over a decade, and according to Janes the seeker has had no major upgrades during that time, which would infer that the seeker technology used in the R-77E (and hence R-27ER/EA) is in fact 1990’s technology (comparable to the AIM-120A/B). The AIM-120’s seeker package has been upgraded 6 times in that timeframe, and the D model introduces features like a 2 way data-link which can transmit seeker generated data back to the launch platform. The seeker hardware must be significantly more sophisticated to allow this to occur. Thus it is clearly a reasonable assumption to state that the AIM-120D provides a more advanced seeker than the R-77E or R-27ER/EA.

A competent Flanker driver gets the first shot with three or four round salvo of long burn R-27 variants, with mixed seekers, leaving one or two remaining salvoes of BVR missiles on his rails, and the same Flanker driver will have modern DRFM monopulse jammers capable of causing likely much more than a 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability. With a thrust vectoring engine capability (TVC), the Flanker driver has the option of making himself into a very
difficult endgame target for the AIM-120 regardless of the capability of his jamming equipment.

10) As discussed earlier the Flanker is unlikely to get the first shot considering the advantages the Rhino enjoys in terms of information dominance. Kinematical performance will not enable first shot if the Rhino remains undetected by the Flanker. In any case a “first shot” is unlikely to be inside the NEZ and thus the 4 round salvo would not increase the PK.

11) The assumption that DRFM deception jamming technology will reduce an AIM-120D’s PK to less than 50% has no real world evidence or even balanced logic behind it. The previous discussion on PK was on average PK not specific missile shot PK and has nothing to do with determining a specific shot’s chances. Thus the below 50% PK on an AIM-120D is an imaginary number. Considering the generic disadvantages this technology has (unless you know the seeker hardware and software that govern the missile it is extremely difficult to effectively fool an advanced active seeker, and them the EM source will itself guide the missile) in most occasions 50% PK reduction is optimistic in my opinion. Even if that is the case the significantly inferior R-77E’s seeker must provide a far inferior PK.

12) TVC will have no positive effect on a platform’s chances of survival with an inbound BVR missile. TVC improves instantaneous turn rates which has a positive impact on WVR engagements, however when dodging a missile the system becomes counter-productive. TVC allows higher instantaneous turn rates (moves the nose around quicker) by diverting thrust; however this has the effect of bleeding airspeed and kinematic energy through increased drag and decreased thrust through axis of movement. Slowing down and thus putting yourself in a low energy state is effectively suicide when facing an incoming, 50g+ rated, BVR missile in a high energy state. It’s impossible to out turn a missile, TVC or not. The missiles Achilles heal is the fact that after the motor burns out (usually after a few dozen seconds) its bleeding energy, and if you can bleed enough energy out of the missile by keeping in a high energy state it is feasible to, in fact, make it impossible for the incoming to maintain the intercept track. The key is to reduce the missiles energy state as early and as much as possible, and TVC only hurts this process. In this situation TVC is a liability simply because it robes you of your greatest asset, energy. However “bleeding” incoming missiles is becoming less and less effective; Meteor and AIM-120D use motors that provide thrust throughout the flight profile (through Ramjet or multi-stage burn rocket motor) equating to high end game energy states.

Since all of the AIM-120s fired are identical in kinematic performance and seeker jam resistance, any measure applied by the Flanker driver which is effective against one AIM-120 round in the salvo is apt to produce the same effect against all AIM-120 rounds - a problem the Flanker driver does not have due to diversity in seeker types and missile kinematics.

13) The number game of missile exchange applies to AMRAAM’s in the same manner it does to Russian missiles. If an AMRAAM has a PK of 50% within the NEZ, 2 AIM-120’s will increase the PK to 75%. The superior seeker performance and ECCM more than makes up for the mixed bag of seekers employed in Russian doctrine (western fighters are also equipped with effective IRCM). Just because a DRFM SPJ is successful in fooling one missile does not increase its chances of repeating that success with the second. Realistically if a platform’s IRCM are as effective as its ECM and the process of employing both is relatively automated, and are not missile specific, mixed seeker incomings should not have any additional effect in terms of countermeasures. Kinematical difference is negligible considering in this scenario (within the NEZ) both of the incoming will be in a much higher energy state and can turn much tighter than the target (Russian or western), thus any difference is academic. In any case the Boeing Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile or JDRADM is the intended to replace the AIM-120D as the US’s primary BVR weapon. The JDRADM will incorporate IIR and Active Radar seeker technology providing a mixed seeker on every missile (enabling precision strike capability), the system should be operational within the next 5 to 10 years and deployed on F/A-18F’s and F-35’s.

Currently classified capabilities such as the use of the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar as an Xband high power jammer against the Russian BARS or Irbis E radar are not a panacea, and may actually hasten the demise of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF in a BVR shootout.This is for the simple reason that to jam the Russian radar, the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar must jam the frequencies being used by the Russian radar, and this then turns the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar into a wholly electronically predictable X-band high power beacon for an anti-radiation seeker equipped Russian BVR missile such as the R-27EP or R-77P. The act of jamming the Russian radar effectively surrenders the frequency hopping agility in the emissions of the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar, denying it the only defence it has against the anti-radiation missile. A smart Russian radar software designer will include a "seduction mode" to this effect, with narrowband emissions to make it very easy even for an early model 9B-1032 anti-radiation seeker. The flipside of the electronic combat game is no better. The F-14A/B/D included the AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track set which allowed a target to be tracked despite hostile jamming of the AWG-9/APG-71 radar. It is clear that the addition of the podded AAS-42 to the Super Hornet and "air to air" use of the JSF EOTS are intended for much the same purpose.

While this may permit the continuing use of the AESA radar to datalink midcourse guidance commands to the AIM-120s, it does nothing to deny the Flanker its own BVR shot. The notion that the defensive jamming equipment and infrared decoys will be highly effective against late model Russian digital missile seekers can only be regarded to be optimistic.

14) The extremely narrow and focused EM beam coupled with excellent side lobe performance that allow 3^rd gen AESA’s to be used as stand off jammers also mean that if the anti radiation missile is not within the boundaries of the beam itself it will likely not be able to detect the EM source (unlike DRFM deception SPJ’s which do not transmit on a single bearing). Thus unless the radar is attempting to jam the missile itself its range will be reduced dramatically. Contemporary BVR missiles achieve current range performance through using semi-ballistic flight profiles. Due to the limitations of line of sight, the AR AAM will have to behave like a beam rider, achieving comparable range performance to early, beam riding, variants of the AIM-7 (comparable in terms of size) thus leading to a maximum effective range in the 20~30nm ballpark. The exact effective range 3^rd gen AESA’s can effectively apply EA effects remains classified, however the USN stated that its effective range was “tactically significant” inferring comparable or greater range to a BVR missile max engagement envelope, or ~100nm. Thus in real terms the AR variant of the R-27 will have no effect on EA capability employed by the F/A-18F or F-35 unless said platforms are in near WVR. In real terms the capability is useless in the vast majority of the BVR regime.

Even within this “effective range” all the transmitting platform has to do is stop jamming the target for a matter of seconds and the incoming missile will lose lock. Once the missile looses the track it will not be able to manoeuvre with the target and when transmission resumes the missile will be out of its acquisition “basket” (i.e. the beam). The F/A-18F can then continue to apply EA effects on the target at will, disrupting comms and degrading radar performance. The only way AR variants of the R-77 or R-27 will be effective is if the transmitting platforms continue to jam the target right up until missile impact, indeed even if the missile is within a km or two and the target stops transmitting the shot is rendered useless. Against a fighter this weapons system has almost no chance of a kill due to the speed and manoeuvrability of the target and fleeting nature of the EM source. The best one can hope for is compelling the threat to cease applying EA on you for a matter of seconds.

15) Currently Russian designers have yet to produce a digital IIR missile seeker for the R-73 missile, which still relies on analogue rotating reticule technology last seen in the west on the AIM-9L/M. Due to the lack of international interest there is, to my knowledge, no major drive for digital IIR seekers on Russian BVR or WRV weapon system’s.

In electronic warfare terms neither side has a decisive advantage, but the Flanker does have a decisive advantage in aircraft and missile kinematics and in having up to six times the payload of BVR missiles to expend. The simple conclusion to be drawn is that operators of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF should make every effort to avoid Beyond Visual Range combat with late model Flankers, as the best case outcome is parity in exchange rates, and the worst case outcome a decisive exchange ratio advantage to the Flanker. Given the evident design choices the Russians have made, this is not an accident, but rather a consequence of well thought through operational analysis of capabilities and limitations of contemporary BVR weapon systems.

16) The ability to apply EA effects at stand off range is currently an ability that the Flanker does not enjoy, and will not, ever (the last production Flanker, the SU-35BM, is equipped with the Irbis PESA radar and its likely that the first Russian platform to field an advanced AESA capable of EA will be the T-50 PAK FA), the F/A-18F and F-35A do however. Additionally the ECCM employed by 3^rd gen AESA’s are significantly more advanced then their Russian peers. The random frequency modulation employed by LPI AESA’s make them virtually impossible to jam through active cancellation and deception simply because it is impossible to predict the next frequency the AESA will use on any number of its beams (i.e. its random). In order to effectively jam the LPI AESA with deception or active cancellation techniques the SPJ or EA source would have to transmit on as many as a thousand specific frequencies which have ben chosen at random by the Radar, i.e. basically impossible. The only form of ECM that has any effect on 3^rd gen AESA’s is 80’s vintage noise jamming, because it transmits loudly on all frequencies throughout the band. This form of ECM has virtually been rendered obsolete by the increased D&T performance of FCR’s (increased burn-through capability) and the HOJ capability provided by many contemporary BVR weapons. The AN/ALR-679(v)3 is a fully digital RWR currently deployed on the F/A-18F, it’s half a generation ahead of current gen (analogue) Flanker RWR. Presently Russian digital RWR technology is still in the developmental stage. Clearly in every area of EW, ECM, ECCM & ELINT the F/A-18F & F-35A hold a distinct advantage.

This conclusion is typical of the tactics, techniques and devices Kopp uses to argue his case. The premises of many of the conclusions stated on the final paragraph are built on arguments made previously under false logic (such as using average PK to determine specific PK) or flat out falsification (such as the inferior war load). Using the faulty or misleading arguments outlined in previous paragraphs, each sprinkled with real capability and fact to increase the feeling of legitimacy, to arrive at the desired conclusion can be very convincing. Hence we must examine the whole article in order to dismantle the conclusion.

How did Dr Kopp reach the conclusions of a best case parity exchange ratio without examining the effect of information dominance and networking on the engagement? The primacy of ISR capability and information distribution has been clearly illustrated in every high intensity conflict fought by the west in the post cold war era. Surely the impact of VLO should be considered before making such damning conclusions? Rendering threat radar performance practically irrelevant should be worth consideration shouldn’t it, particularly considering X band radars dominate BVR engagements? Not once was the effect of RCS reduction addressed in the whole article. On three or four occasions Kopp examines an engagement that is clearly 4^th gen platforms manoeuvring within the others radar footprint, and then lumps the F-35 in the conclusion even though VLO renders the previous comparison utterly moot.

In fact how is a Flanker going to achieve a 1 to 1 exchange ratio with an F-35 when it lacks the ability to effectively engage or track the platform with its primary sensor at BVR? Oh, that’s right the IRST! Yet another conclusion drawn from a previous argument based on misleading information and half truths. Not even western designers have achieved performance even close to AESA radars with IIR technology, and even Dr Kopp admits the Russians are yet to field systems as advanced as operational western designs (the developmental OLS on the MiG-35 is the only Russian system comparable to current gen western technology like PIRATE). The critical factor with IRST technology is it can not effectively search a large volume in the same manner as a Radar, its akin to searching for an aircraft in the sky with a pair of binoculars when you don’t know its there and you cant hear it. Even if technically an IRST can detect an afterburning F-35 at 50 or 100km, without another sensor cueing the IRST (like if you heard the aircraft or someone else told you to look with your binoculars) its chances are one in a million. Even if the IRST does acquire the F-35 it can not effectively track the target (IRST’s can not generate range information and thus a track) and relies on a laser range finder. The only feasible way for an IRST to track a VLO target is if it is cued by an RWR/ESM, which is difficult considering all F-35’s comms and active sensors are LPI, and in combat many will have stringent EMCON procedures applied (i.e. probably EM Cold receiving sensor information from other platforms). In short the F-35 equipped force will have a near clear picture of the battle space, and the Flanker equipped force will have nothing of the sort i.e. wont be able to detect or track the threat platforms with supporting ISR platforms or fighter Fire Control Radars. Anyone who has an objective viewpoint and has examined the effect on information dominance on modern air campaigns (including desert storm) should come to the conclusion that a 1 for 1 exchange ratio is extremely optimistic for the Flanker equipped force.

Over and over again Kopp presents opinion as fact and the authority the average reader grants the writer allows him to effectively do so, often without question. He continually uses prior conclusions as evidence, however those prior conclusions are invariably built on analysis that either deliberately omits vital elements or blatantly falsifies information. In effect Kopp has constructed a house of cards with specious analysis and conclusion using prior specious analysis and falsehood as its foundation, which like any house of cards collapses if one critically examines the assumptions and claims that hold the entire argument together. Someone who continually needs to resort to such tactics to argue his case must have a serious personal interest in being seen to be correct (even if in reality he is not) that goes far beyond pride or patriotic interest. Indeed the systematic way Dr Kopp builds artificial conclusions on spurious analysis and distortion indicates a malicious intention to mislead the reader rather than stimulate thought and genuine debate.

Resources:

http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw000904_5_n.shtml

http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jalw/jalw3025.html

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-BVR-AAM.html

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/218m-for-new-aim120d-amraam-lead-materials-02249/

The integrated air defence system Australia had to have.

Australia enjoys a unique geographical position with perhaps the most strategic depth of any nation. However this tyranny of distance comes at a price. With an arc measuring over 6500 km’s of air and ocean that make up the sea-air gap to our north, calling the task of defending our northern approaches for a navy of twelve major surface combatants and six submarines challenging is perhaps somewhat of an understatement. Therefore the long range, firepower and speed of response that air power provides means the RAAF will always play the primary role in the defence of the sea-air gap. The RAAF’s ability to monitor, operate in and dominate the battle space to our north is and has been a cornerstone of the nations defence in the post world war era. Consequently in order to maintain the capability edge the RAAF has enjoyed over our neighbors in the last 6 decades a world class, integrated air defence system has been implemented by the ADF and should be fully operational by 2013.

An improved kill chain:

In order to implement the improvement in capability needed every link in the kill chain is either undergoing significant upgrade or new elements are being added to achieve a truly flexible and lethal air combat system.

Providing theatre wide ISR capability is the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) which has a range in excess of 3000km’s. JORN provides early warning capability throughout the sea-air gap and is capable of monitoring most aircraft (non-VLO) and practically all naval traffic throughout the northern approaches. The system works by refracting HF radio waves off the ionosphere to achieve ranges well beyond conventional radar limitations. The transmitter and receiver arrays are both located in central Australia over 1000km’s inland at Longreach Queensland and Laverton Western Australia. This distance from any threat does limit the systems vulnerability, with only a small number of global powers possessing the capability to effectively reach the systems vital components and none in our region. It appears the system does have some current limitations however; the resolution achieved by HF may not be high enough for weapons cueing, particularly when dealing with airborne threats. Therefore JORN can not effectively act as a targeting platform and is essentially a wide area surveillance asset.

JORN's sensor footprint







In order to provide target quality radar track data on air and sea targets the RAAF has ordered 6 E-737 Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft scheduled for initial operating capability (IOC) in 2010. Each of these world leading new platforms is equipped with Northrop Grumman’s revolutionary Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar, which is in effect a large and extremely sophisticated AESA. Exact radar capabilities are classified but the MESA is reported to have an IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) range in excess of 500 kilometres and can track over 3000 targets. The L band MESA will be able to very precisely track small, high speed, low altitude targets such as Anti Ship Missiles in addition to allowing individual platforms to take ‘EM cold’ AIM-120 missile shots. Wedgetail will provide the ADF with a stand off targeting and surveillance capability that is highly mobile, extremely capable and precise. It is likely to be the nucleus of all future RAAF packages after its introduction.

E737 Wedgetail

The RAAF’s main air superiority asset, the F/A-18C/D HUG Hornet is likely to continue to see service until 2017. The Hornet fleet has undergone significant upgrades throughout its service with the RAAF and is now far more capable than when originally delivered. The inclusion of the AN/APG-73 radar, a fully glassed cockpit, Link 16, AN/ALR-67(V)3 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and a modernized weapons suite including the AIM-132 ASRAAM provides the RAAF with a very capable platform even considering the current and projected threat environment.

F/A-18C Hornet


With the announcement of the retirement of the F-111C~G fleet in 2010 and its replacement with the F/A-18F Block II the RAAF will receive its first new combat platform in over 20 years. The F/A-18F BII is a highly sophisticated multi role fighter that is based on a revised legacy Hornet airframe and is about 30% larger. Although visually the Super Hornet may seem similar to its predecessor the two only share only 10% commonality. The F/A-18F BII is equipped with a “5th generation” avionics suite lifted from failed X-32 JSF contender built around the AN/APG-79 AESA radar. This system is described by many as the most capable fighter sized radar operational anywhere, with extremely small side lobes, significantly greater detection and track radii than legacy radar’s, Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) search and track, improved resistance to Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), a latent electronic attack capability (EA) and near instantaneous scan rates. This in combination with the other advanced features of the avionics suite such as the world leading Human User Interface (HUI), fibre-optic data bus and digital AN/ALR-67 (V)3 RWR makes the F/A-18F BII an extremely capable strike asset and Beyond Visual Range (BVR) fighter.

F/A-18F Super Hornet

The addition of the F-35A to the RAAF’s order of battle in 2015 (under the current plans) will add LO to the significant capabilities the Super Hornet provides, in addition to an even more advanced HUI, Electro Optical (EO) and Electronic Warfare (EW) suite’s. The 5th generation F-35A is a quantum leap in capability as the first LO platform operated by the RAAF, and is at least half a generation ahead of any possible threat platform out to 2025.

The RAAF has operated nearly all of the AIM-120 AMRAAM derivatives, AIM-120B first integrated on the F/A-18C/D fleet in 2002. This BVR missile has been the cornerstone of western aligned air forces for the last decade and was the first air to air missile equipped with an active radar seeker and data link to see widespread use. The latest derivative of the AMRAAM series is the AIM-120D, which will reach IOC with the USAF and USN later this year. The AIM-120D is a significantly improved AMRAAM derivative, with a maximum engagement envelope of over 180 kilometres; which is some 50 kilometres more than the longest ranging missile in the SU-30’s inventory, the R-27 ER/EA Alamo Long Burn. The AIM-120D also provides a significantly advanced seeker with improved Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM), larger acquisition basket and the ability to engage a target more intelligently. A major capability the AIM-120D provides is an improved two way data link which allows the missile to actively communicate with the launch platform relaying target acquisition data and other information. An additional capability this data link provides is the AIM-120D can be updated directly from a 3rd party, such as another platform or AEW&C asset. Currently equipped with the AIM-120C5 variant, the RAAF is almost certain to acquire the AIM-120D as soon as it is made available for export.

AIM-120D

With the retirement of the F-111 fleet and its replacement with the Super Hornet every platform in the RAAF’s order of battle will be Link 16 compatible. This high speed, high capacity, “unjamable” data link can transmit at up to 115.2 kbps allowing platforms to exchange tactical information in near real time. At the package or squadron level, Link 16 provides every platform an AEW&C generated radar picture that in addition to achieving much higher detection & track radii, will provide LPI and better ECCM (significantly so when compared to the AN/APG-73). This technique will allow said platform to engage targets without using their own radars for target acquisition and illumination which is a considerable tactical advantage. At the theatre level, Link 16 allows decision makers in the battle space to see a wide variety of ISR sources such as a JORN generated radar picture or the contacts generated by a platform’s RWR. This information distribution network will provide the RAAF with a near complete picture of the battle space particularly when the quality of the sensors feeding it is considered.

The ground component to this information gathering and distribution network is being implemented under AIR 5333 Vigilare ground based air defence system. Vigilare is a significant upgrade to the existing Command, Control, Communications & Computer (C4) systems currently used by the ADF. The system will compile data from a variety of sources such as JORN and Wedgetail and present a manageable and user friendly air picture covering Australia’s area of interest. This will provide what is considered the holy grail of air command & control, a clear and comprehensive picture of the battle space. This C4ISR platform will enable command to manage the battle space in a far more efficient manner, allowing the full potential of the ADF’s sensor systems to be utilized.

The combination of a world class information gathering and distribution network and extremely capable people, missiles and platforms will provide the ADF with an integrated air combat system without peer in the region.

Tactical Implications

State on state conflict is a systems based event, therefore the implications of this vastly improved air defence system are extremely significant and wide, ranging from the tactical to the strategic. Perhaps the greatest advantage of an extensive information gathering and distribution network is the massive improvement in situational awareness, battle space management and command decision making. The amalgamation and presentation of information provided by theatre wide ISR platforms as capable as Wedgetail and JORN have an enormous force multiplier effect. JORN will allow interception of intruding strike packages at maximum range, allowing engagement outside the threat cruise missile envelope. This capability does to an extent replace the need for a high speed interceptor. The RAAF’s maritime strike capability is also vastly enhanced by this system; it allows accurate threat assessment of enemy fleet operations, the utilization of the most effective strike profiles and the system can even conduct some battle damage assessment, all from the Australian mainland. By utilising a clear air and sea picture through out the sea-air gap, the ADF can utilise limited assets to the full. Realistically conducting an offensive campaign in JORN dominated battle space is not an attractive proposition for any of the global powers and is arguably not even realistic for any regional power.

The effects of information dominance provided by such an information gathering and distribution network are not limited only to theatre wide decisions; on the package level having information superiority is a decisive advantage. The ability to achieve the positional advantage is vital in any BVR or WVR engagement, and fighting within your own sensor footprint is a good way to ensure your ability to do just that. By providing the pilot with precise tracks of targets well beyond their own radar capabilities and the threat’s, you enable them to take the positional advantage in a number of ways, such as taking a missile shot from outside the threat’s radar footprint or from a position of altitude or kinematical advantage. In effect you allow the package to always fight on its own terms, and even in a superior platform prosecuting an engagement from a position of significant disadvantage is likely to be your demise. If the target has been engaged from outside their radar footprint, and has no AEW&C support, it’s likely the first detection of a threat would occur when the missiles radar seeker started emitting, which is far too late.

NCW concept

The effect of information distribution between platforms also has a significant effect on the employment of BVR missiles. Currently all BVRAAM’s are not truly fire and forget weapons when being used at long range. Although the R-77, PL-12/SD-10, MICA and AIM-120 series all have an inertial navigation system that can guide the missile unaided, without constant updates from the launch platform at significant ranges the disparity between the projected position and actual target track drastically reduces the probability of a kill. Therefore the launch platform has to illuminate the target for much of the missiles flight which severely limits options to manoeuvre; this significantly increases the counter engagement threat. The combination of Wedgetail, Link-16 and AIM-120D will allow the launch platform to make 150km+ ranged missile shots without using its radar as the fire control device, reducing the chance of RWR/ESM detection to near zero, achieve positional advantage, and manoeuvre virtually as soon as the missile has left the rail. The platform that is not part of a similar information gathering and distribution network will be at a severe disadvantage; prosecuting an engagement on the enemy’s terms, against a target that is rapidly manoeuvring while their own manoeuvre options are severely limited, again if the enemy launch platform is detected at all.

With the addition of the F-35A to the RAAF’s order of battle a LO platform will be added to this already formidable air defence system. With a radar cross section of less than .001 M2, contemporary radar detection levels are reduced to tactically insignificant levels. Therefore the F-35A will be able to take AIM-120D missile shots directly in front of a threat platform within what would normally be its radar footprint. This also applies to threat AEW&C platforms, LO renders them practically useless severely limiting the capability of any competing information gathering and distribution networks.

F-35A Joint Strike Fighter

The decisive advantage integrated networks provide is obvious, and once in place ensuring the integrity of your network and disrupting the enemies becomes paramount. This dual task falls primarily under the dark art of Electronic Warfare. In addition to Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), EW can be roughly divided into two major elements; disrupting the enemy’s communications and sensor capability or ECM, and keeping your sensor performance and communications intact or ECCM. Both of these capabilities are being significantly upgraded under the current modernization program.

The AN/APG-79 has a significant ECM capability that is being developed by Raytheon under the USN’s spiral development program. The extremely precise beam control and frequency modulation combined with the radar’s power output mean it can act as a very effective jammer, and according to the USN is achieving extremely substantial EA effects at “tactically significant ranges”, which would imply comparable distances to a BVR missile engagement envelope. This EA capability is intended to degrade radar capability at stand off range and interrupt data links.


An/APG-79 AESA








Although still in early development the latent EA capability of the baseline F/A-18F BII is significant, and any future software upgrades developed to exploit it will surely migrate to the RAAF fleet. A comparable capability will be provided in the F-35A’s EW suite utilising its AN/APG-81 AESA radar. In addition to the EA capabilities of the baseline Super Hornet Block 2, there has been a notable level of interest in the dedicated EW variant, the EA-18G Growler. Fitted with the AN/ALQ-99 EW system the Growler can simultaneously produce EA effects on several different frequencies with a much higher power output and range. This variant was mentioned by the Defence Minister Fitzgibbon in a recent press release announcing the continuation of the F/A-18F acquisition indicating a significant level of interest from the Ministry of Defence. The extremely complicated LPI scan techniques used in 3rd gen AESA and MESA radars give them very effective ECCM capability, the sophisticated nature of their beam and frequency modulation make them very difficult to effectively jam. Additionally Link 16 has a very effective frequency hopping capability that provides significant resistance to active jamming. EW will always be an ever evolving battle between ECM and ECCM, and thanks to the depth of the strategic alliance with the US, the ADF will have access to their ongoing EW programs which are the most extensive and well funded worldwide.

In a rapidly evolving strategic environment the construction of a world class information gathering and distribution network as the foundation of lethal integrated air defence system is a key to the ADF’s ongoing military superiority in South East Asia. Once all of the elements are in place information dominance throughout the sea-air gap is virtually guarantied, and the RAAF’s lethality will improve accordingly. The ability to apply maximum combat capability at the appropriate point through a clear air picture, to take EM cold, AEW&C cued BVR missile shots from an advantageous position then rapidly egress or manoeuvre, and degrade enemy radar performance and disrupt communications will allow the ADF to dominate practically any engagement, regardless of individual platform capability or deficiency. This only partially illustrates the importance of the integrated system when evaluating aggregate capability, and the partial futility of platform centric analysis. The preservation of truly capable people, information dominance and organization wide improvement is the key to maintaining the RAAF’s capability edge, and it is a goal that we must constantly strive to achieve.

Russian Carrier Doctrine in the 21st Century, the Strategic Conundrum

Past Mindset/Present Doctrine

Cold War

Throughout the last half of the 20th century the Soviet Union faced a simple and clearly defined, though extremely challenging set of strategic requirements. The major threat faced by the USSR in this period came from the western alliance NATO, and any conflict between the two would have centered on the primary theater in northern Germany. The prospect of a large combined arms campaign across western Germany and on to the English Channel was the predominant strategic challenge for both east and west, and just as in 1942 the western allies’ jugular lay across the Atlantic. Supplying NATO formations in the field during high intensity operations on such a scale would require huge amounts materiel from the continental United States, were the bulk of NATO’s industrial power lay. Therefore severing NATO’s jugular through interdiction of the Atlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) became the driving strategic focus of the Red Fleet, shaping its structure, operational & tactical doctrine, vessels, equipment, weapons and training. Consequently by the 1960’s the Red Fleet became a devastating tool of naval interdiction.

By the early 1980’s structurally the Red Fleet reflected the strategic requirements that drove its development; its two major strengths lay in tools of naval interdiction, the submarine arm and land based naval aviation, both of which were the most capable (and numerous) operational anywhere. The doctrine was simple, at the operational level the combination of conventional or nuclear submarine’s with long range, land based naval aviation directed by orbital & suborbital ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) assets. On the tactical level, local saturation of the battle space at the critical point through application of overwhelming numbers of both platforms and weapons. At both the tactical and operational level, this doctrine could be, and historically has been devastatingly effective if applied correctly.

Left: A Tu-22M Backfire Right: A Tu-16 Badger

Clearly the most formidable tool the Soviet Navy possessed in this period was its maritime strike capability. Red Fleet naval aviation was built on the long range maritime strike platform and anti ship missile (AShM), the most capable of which is the Tu-22M Backfire. The infamous Backfire boasts a refueled combat radius of several thousand nautical miles, a top sprint speed of over Mach 2, a maximum payload of 3 supersonic AShM’s and a powerful surface search radar. Coupled with the long range, supersonic AShM like the AS-4 Kitchen the Backfire became a truly fearsome maritime strike platform. During this time frame the Northern Fleet maintained 3 regiments of Tu-22M’s on the Kola peninsular poised to strike south into the Atlantic SLOC.

Tu-22M equipped with the deadly AS-4 Kitchen.

The driving factor behind the development of the Tu-22M and Soviet carrier evolution was the USN’s introduction of an extremely capable fleet interceptor, the F-14A~C Tomcat. When the Tomcat appeared on the decks of the USN’s super-carriers the Red Fleets primary maritime strike asset of the past two decades, the Tu-16 Badger was virtually rendered obsolete. The long range interception ability, high speed and multi target engagement capability provided by the revolutionary AWG-9/AIM-54 Phoenix radar missile combination, in conjunction with E-2A~C gave the USN the ability to detect, track and engage Tu-16 strike packages well outside of the Badgers AShM engagement envelope. In order to counter the lethal threat of AEW controlled, AWG-9/AIM-54 equipped, long range interceptors, a platform that could fill the Tu-16’s role with comparable or better range/payload performance and a top sprint speed of Mach 2+ was clearly required. The primary alternative, the Tu-22B Blinder was originally designed in the 1950’s. The platform however proved to be an abject failure, with poor reliability and range/payload performance. It was only produced in small numbers. Consequently it never comprehensively replaced the Tu-16 in front line formations. The eventual answer to the changed threat matrix was the vastly improved Tu-22M.

Left: an F-14 carrying a 6x AIM-54 Phoenix load Right: A Tu-95 intercepted by an F-14

Soviet Carrier

The evolution of modern soviet carriers was like the rest of the Red Fleet shaped by the strategic landscape of the cold war. Unlike the classical western train of thought on the use and purpose of the aircraft carrier, primarily power projection, Soviet doctrine did not view the carrier as a means of offense on its own. This is clearly evident in the first generation of Soviet cold war aircraft carrier, the Kiev class Heavy Aviation Cruiser. Equipped primarily with ASW helicopters and only twelve Yak-38 STOVL fighters, the Kiev’s aviation component was more akin to the intended (pre Falkland’s) use of the Invincible class as ASW platforms with a limited fleet air defense component. Designed to be the centre of surface ASW groups, the Kiev class were far from true carriers. The Kiev’s primary firepower lay in its organic AShM load, which is typical of the primacy Soviet doctrine placed on this form of weapon.

A Kiev Class Heavy Aviation Cruiser

There was however a significant shift in doctrine during the 1970’s. Due to the increasing lethality of the USN’s fleet air defense and maritime strike capability, the first true Soviet carrier was designed and commissioned. The first of its class, the 65,000 tonne Admiral Kuznetsov was and is the only true, operational Soviet carrier ever built. Equipped with a ski jump and arrestor gear, Kuznetsov can operate conventional fighters using Short Take Off but Assisted Recovery (STOBAR) techniques. Embarking a squadron of 12~16 Su-33 Flanker D fighters the Red Fleet could for the first time project a credible fighter force into the North Atlantic and beyond.

Kuznetsov had two primary effects on the cold war naval balance. For the first time Soviet ASW surface groups operating in the western Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean could enjoy credible organic fighter cover, something that had been severely lacking previously. But perhaps more importantly, now the Red Fleet had the ability to put capable fighters deep into the North Atlantic, which could then provide land based maritime strike packages with fighter escort during the terminal phase of an engagement. This would have a dramatic effect when facing a USN carrier battle group or heavily escorted convoy. In addition to attempting to intercept an inbound strike package’s ingression at Mach 2, any F-14A~C would now have to contend with a counter engagement threat. An F-14 supporting several AIM-54 missile shots would have to maneuver if engaged by an R-27 equipped Su-33, which would in turn have a dramatic effect on the Phoenix shot’s probability of a kill (PK). Providing the Tu-22M with a fighter escort would not only increase the package’s survivability but lethality as well, allowing more missile’s to be launched before interception which is critical to Soviet doctrine of battle space saturation.

Left:The Admiral Kutznetsov Right:An Su-33 Flanker D

Obviously the Soviet carrier force was designed around a distinctly different doctrine to its western counterparts, intended from the outset to work closely with the Red Fleets primary strike asset; the land based supersonic strike aircraft. The Kiev’s and Kuznetsov clearly show the Atlantic/cold war centric strategic thinking that dominated every aspect of the Red Fleet, illustrated by the fact that Soviet carriers were only designed with true power projection as a far afterthought; Kuznetsov embarking only 5 strike capable platforms. In short the Soviet aircraft carrier was designed completely around a specific set of strategic requirements with only one potential foe in mind. For better or for worse, this is the carrier force and doctrine that the modern Russian navy has inherited.

The Strategic Conundrum

After the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, like most of the Soviet military the Red Fleet fractured into several national formations distributed between the former Soviet Republics. The largest slice of this massive pie was left to the largest former Soviet Republic, the Russian Federation. However the modern Russian Navy is but a shell of the former Red Fleet. After widespread economic collapse and massive funding shortages during the 1990’s dozens of vessels and aircraft were decommissioned, scrapped or simply left to rust in port. The carrier force was not spared either, with all 4 Kiev class cruisers sold to the Peoples Republic of China (Currently Kiev is now an operating military theme park in the port of Tianjin China, Minsk is being fitted as a museum in China) , broken up (Novorossiyk), or undergoing re-fit in order to be sold to India (Admiral Gorshkov). The only operational carrier left in the Russian navy is the Admiral Kuznetosv. The same bleak story is repeated across the breadth of the Russian navy, with land based Naval Aviation and the Submarine Arm suffering terribly throughout this dark period.

Left:A Foxtrot class SSK rusting in a Russian naval base. Right:Kiev world military theme park, Tianjin

However, fueled by high global demand for energy, oil rich Russia has seen a remarkable economic resurgence of late, allowing a significant increase in funding for the whole Russian military. Notably this precipitated the resumption of Strategic Bomber patrols in 2007 and the first operational deployment of a carrier battle group to the Mediterranean for over a decade. These are small steps, but they are the first on the long road out of the dark days of the 90’s for the Russian navy.

The strategic terrain facing the Russia in 2008 is vastly different to what the Soviet Union faced in the 1970’s and 80’s. There is now no longer any major threat to mainland Russia and no realistic possibility of a war of national survival in the foreseeable future. Therefore the driving strategic focus of virtually every aspect of the Red Fleet, naval interdiction of the Atlantic SLOC, is now a moot point. Currently the Russian navy faces the conundrum of being equipped with an operational doctrine, structure, vessels, weapons and training, all heavily optimized for a set of strategic requirements that no longer exist. In more ways than one Russia stands at the strategic crossroads.

The Contemporary Strategic Landscape

The strategic challenges facing Russia in the early 21st century differ greatly from the last half of the 20th. Apart from the fact that any real (rather than perceived) threat from NATO is now gone Russia finds itself in a greatly different position to its Soviet ancestor. The overarching strategic goal is vastly different to the ideological struggle with the west that dominated the Russian/Soviet thinking during the cold war. The contemporary prize is not ideological supremacy over a dreaded enemy, but economic growth through tapping global markets. Therefore Russia’s mid term strategic goal has shifted to becoming a viable global alternative to the US as the guarantor of local security for smaller nations.

Becoming the guarantor of regional security does grant a level of political hegemony, but more importantly it secures economic ties and reduces impediments to trade. The economic rewards of regional hegemony are clearly evident in America’s position in the Middle East, which provides the US with both a significant source of foreign investment and a large portion of its energy requirements. This fundamentally different strategic landscape posses some interesting challenges to Russian decision makers in the mid term, which will have to change not only their military structure and posture, but the way they are viewed by both the wider global community and themselves.

20% of the US's crude oil imports are from hegemonic allies in the middle east.







Emergent Russia now faces a brand new set of strategic goals, however does not currently now have the tools, or more fundamentally the doctrine to achieve them. The Russian navy is still visibly the mired in the cold war, with what operational units it has left geared heavily toward naval interdiction. If Russia is to be successful in providing security to areas of the globe that stretch beyond its current sphere of influence then it must eventually turn to its navy as a tool of power projection, something the Soviet Union only contemplated but never truly achieved. Central to this question is the current and future carrier force and specifically what role it will play in Russia’s forthcoming global strategic posture and operational doctrine.


Strategic Air Power centric operational doctrine

Perhaps the smallest shift for Russia to undertake would be to peruse a Strategic Air Power centric operational doctrine, simply because the primary element remains the land based strike platform. Operating under the pretense of strategic air power being the primary tool of power projection beyond continental Europe and Asia is well suited to the current Russian operational doctrine, tactics, training and equipment. Russia’s strategic air power is arguably in better shape than the carrier force, with several regiments of Tu-95’s, Tu-22M’s and Tu-160’s currently operational and undertaking widespread training exercises. Russia’s strategic air arm is still extremely potent, coupled with its formidable cruise missile capability it gives decision makers in the Kremlin a viable method of projecting power well beyond its borders. This seems to be the path being perused at the moment with the continued (although limited) production of the Tu-160 Blackjack and development of new stand off missile’s such as the KH-101 and KH-555.

Left:A KH-555 loaded on a Tu-95 Right:A Tu-160 launching a KH-55S Kent

However strategic air power faces a similar challenge to what soviet naval aviation faced in the 70’s and 80’s; operating at extended range against a target that may have organic fighter cover. This problem is exacerbated due to the particulars of attacking land based targets as opposed to ships in blue water. The major difference is the fact that land based targets usually enjoy a level of geographical depth. Even if your strike platform is equipped with a 300nm range standoff weapon, if the target lays 200nm inland the strike package will have to come within 100nm of going “feet dry” to reach weapons release point. Therefore the strikers will have to enter the targets fighter engagement footprint in order to employ weapons effectively. Utilizing high speed ingression and organic EWSP suites it is most likely that the strike packages would still hit their targets when facing a lesser power; however the losses may be unacceptably high considering the cost and time to manufacture a single Tu-160. Additionally the survivability of a Tu-95 when facing even a limited fighter threat may not be acceptable, significantly limiting the number of available platforms. Clearly if the Russians were facing a reasonably well equipped foe the strike packages would require fighter escort while entering the targets fighter engagement footprint.

The value of strategic strike platforms is such that even a moderate risk of loss to the targets air defense system may be enough to deter the Kremlin from taking assertive action if its direct interests or security are not threatened. However if the Russian navy could provide the strike packages with a fighter escort the risk of interception would be significantly reduced. If a Carrier battle group could be deployed to the theater, it would not need a significant amount of organic strike capability, the punching power would be delivered by the land based strike platform. Current Russian carrier doctrine and equipment is well suited to this posture. If such a scenario were to play out in 2009 and the assets were deployable, Kuznetsov deployed to theater with 16 Su-33’s could provide strategic aviation with credible fighter cover, allowing the Kremlin to apply devastating power against a much larger range of possible adversaries. This doctrinal change is cheap, effective and more to the point does not stray far from the pervasive soviet operational doctrine which preceded it.

Left:A Tu-160 escorted by a Su-27 Flanker. Right:A vulnerable Tu-95 intercepted by a Typhoon off the UK .

Aircraft Carrier centric operational doctrine

The other possible option is the pursuit of an operational doctrine and that is centered on the Carrier as the primary tool of power projection. This is the doctrine employed by the world’s greatest naval power, the United States Navy. In engagements that range from Leyte Gulf to the Operation Rolling Thunder to Operation Allied Force, the utility of the carrier as a tool of power projection has been clearly illustrated. The ability to move credible air power into the theater and sustain it there regardless of air field availability is a capability that only the carrier can provide, and the effect of a single carrier deployment to a region is greater than perhaps any other single asset. Truly the potential of a carrier to change the posture and intentions of a lesser power is profound.

Unlike the major western carrier operators (the USN and France) Russia’s carriers are poorly equipped to be used in this manner. As stated previously the air-group Kuznetsov is currently capable of embarking is heavily geared towards fleet air defense and bomber escort. However the Kuznetsov has reasonable potential as a tool of power projection, the main element needing reform is the air group. If the aging Su-33’s are upgraded to Su-30MK standard, or replaced with MiG-29K’s or the newest navalized Flanker the Su-27KUB the Russian navy will have taken a major step foreword. However this will take significant expenditure as frontline fighters are not cheap, and in the short term upgrading existing strategic air power with better standoff weapons is a cheaper and easier path to take.

Left:A MiG 29K Right:A relative of the Flanker Family, the multi-role Su-30

The critical decisions will be in the mid term. As Kuznetsov reaches the end of its operational life, the type and nature of its replacements will define Russia’s 21st century power projection doctrine. If the replacement carriers are equipped and armed in much the same manner as Kuznetov then Russian strategic thinking will be evident; the primacy of strategic air power will remain. However if the new breed of carriers are equipped with truly multi-role fighters, and there is significant investment in the fleet logistical train to sustain deployed air groups throughout an offensive air campaign then obviously Russia will have moved to a stance similar to the major western powers.

Conclusions

The strategic geography of the 21st century is still taking shape and, in many ways is more dynamic now than it has been in the past 100 years. The emergence of new powers and new markets illustrates the clear departure from the strategic paradigm of the cold war, with contemporary strategic rivals usually also close trading partners (such as PROC & the US). In this dynamic new strategic environment the battle will no longer lay along ideological fault lines but in economic areas of interest. Therefore whatever decisions are made by the Kremlin on Russia’s future global structure and posture, clearly the current status quo can not meet the requirements of the contemporary strategic environment.

Both options have their advantages, however clearly strategic air power can never replace the utility, sustainability, firepower and psychological impact of true carrier capability. Relying on strategic air power as your primary tool has significant limitations. For Russia to achieve global presence, which is clearly the mid term goal she must enjoy truly global reach, and due to the limitations of land based air power without a global basing infrastructure it is not something that can be achieved. Without airborne refueling Russian strategic aviation is limited by range/payload constraints, which in real terms restricts combat range (with a useful payload) to the north Atlantic/Pacific, Europe, North Asia and North America. Currently it only provides Russia with regional/continental reach, far short of the truly global capability required to truly be an alternative to the US as the provider of regional security. Nevertheless Strategic Air Power offers a cheap, readymade capability that with a relatively small capital outlay can be effective in a short time-frame. It seems to be the path undertaken by the Russians in the short term.
The ill fated Soviet Ulyanovsk supercarrier, a true tool of power porjection.

Clearly post 2020 the most effective option for the Russian navy is a combination of land and naval aviation used in conjunction to achieve global strategic results. Recently the Kremlin announced plans for the construction of 5~6 aircraft carriers in the 2020+ timeframe. Obviously the achievability of this number has to be questioned, unless a small (<20kt)> STOVL design is adopted. Perhaps a more realistic goal would be construction of three, 40,000T carriers with a comparable design to Kuznetov. For all its shortcomings in payload constraints and package generation capability, the technological simplicity of STOVL (and the complexity of steam catapults) lends it self well to the new, lean Russian navy. A sustainable number of carriers supported by land based aviation with an increasing global basing infrastructure will provide Russia with the capability it needs to achieve its strategic aims. Both the flexibility and sustainability of carrier based aviation means that only it can achieve the global reach Russia requires, however it remains to be seen whether the Kremlin has the fortitude or vision to realize that fact.

Four Corners, Flying Blind indeed

On the 29'th of October this year the ABC current affairs programme Four Corners aired an episode named "Flying Blind" which addressed Australia's recent decision to purchase the F/A-18F super hornet as a replacement for the RAAF's ageing F-111C/G fleet. The ratio of "critics" to "defenders" seems to havebeen stacked in favor of the negative camp at the number of 5 to, um none (not including the three lines an RAAF pilot was afforded), which pretty clearly shows the programmes intent. It was basically a hatchet job. Accordingly there was a distinct lack of objectivity in the analysis presented, which seems to be a common theme on both "sides" of this debate, so i will try to provide some. The programme, and the discussion that has followed on other defence blogs and forums, centered around three major points; that the F-111 did not need to be retired and could/should be retained until the introduction of the F-35A , that the F/A-18F is incapable of replacing the F-111 in the strike role, and that the F-15E should have been procured instead, I will address these points in turn.


F-111's wrongful retirement.

The F-111 Aardvark, or "pig" as it is affectionately known, was introduced into the RAAF ORBAT in June 1973 after a much belated decade long wait, and have now been in service for 35 odd years. One of the primary reasons for the decision to retire the "pig", in addition to the fear of an availability and capability gap arising post 2010, was a wing stress test conducted by the DSTO which indicated that under certain, high stress conditions the wings would be prone to failure. This is of utmost importance for the F-111, which fly's most of its strike profiles at high speed and low altitude (-50 meter) altitude, which puts huge stress on the airframe. Understandably the notion of the wings falling off while scooting along at 600 knots scraping the tree tops was not a palatable one for the DoD or DefMin. However a claim was made on 4 Corners by Air Vice Marshal Criss (ret) that an unnamed person had informed him that the test had been conducted by the DSTO under incorrect parameters. This has been lauded by the "pro F-111" camp as evidence that the pig has been retired under false pretences. Now whether or not this claim is indeed true, and there has been no conclusive evidence of such apart from hearsay, that does not change the fundamental problem with the pig. It is not simply a question of a single flaw in the platform which renders it unsafe or incapable, looking at the problem in such a simple context does not do the RAAF or the Australian public justice in my opinion.

an F-111C at low altitude


The retirement of the pig needs to be looked at from a cost to benifit analysis perspective, which is not the view portrayed 4 corners. It was stated by Wing Comander (ret) Chriss Mills that the F-111 could be kept in the air "virtually forever" due to the availability of spares in USAF boneyards. While this technically may be the case it is in reality a moot point. We could keep spitfires flying "virtually forever" if we decided too, and even if there wasnt abundent spare parts we could conceavably manufacture what we needed. Anyway there is also a problem with a lack of spare parts with the rocket ejection system, and the current stocks will decay in the 2010~2012 timeframe. If there is a catostrophic accident after that time the crew will not be able to bail out. Now again we can make the stuff if we realy wanted to, but as an esteemed member of the defence community eloquently put it "Its not weather you can make a replacement widget, its wether the cost/benefit analysis, public interest, platform investment and risk analysis all make sense". As is invairiably the case with airframes the older the platform the higher the maintinance costs, the lower the mean time between failure rates and higher maintinance manhours per flight hour. The F-111 fleet is therefore becoming more expensive to run by the day and it is becoming harder to maintain adequate numbers of operational aircraft. This is the same problem the USN faced with the F-14D Tomcat. That platform arguably offered much more capability in contemporary terms than the F-111, however it was retired (much to the discust of 'cat lovers) due to the masive maintinance costs, in both manhour's per flight hour and cold hard cash. At the end of its career the F-14D needed a stagerring 40 maintinance man hours per flight hour just to keep the platform operational. If we intend to keep the F-111 flying "forever" or post 2010 the RAAF will be looking at a similar picture. So is the much vaunted "strategic deturrence" and jaw droping capability of the pig worth the ever growing maintinance, availability and monetary costs? Well unfortunatly in the 21st century threat environment, the F-111 just does not deliver the same capability it did in the 1970's.











F-14D, 40 maintanence man-hours per flight hour has a drastic effect on availability rates

F-111 vs F/A-18F

On papaer alone the F111 is a better strike platform. Longer range, heavier payload, higher flat out sprint speed (it still holds the record of the fastest platfrom in the region, just) and plain sex apeal all go to the pig. Its almost like the platform that all by itself elevates Australia to a major power. Well it may have 25 years ago, but the sad truth is in the current threat environment it has LESS range, LESS usable payload and its speed no longer holds the tactical significance it used to (Still has the sex apeal though). Under current RAAF operational doctorine an F-111 can not conduct a strike mission in a theater were there is any air threat without an F/A 18C escort, simply because the pig is not survivable in the modern threat environment. The F-111's forte is high speed low altitude penitration which it achieves by utilising terrain following radar, which was state of the art in the 1970's. However in the face of an SU 30 air threat, equiped with the BARS PESA radar system & R77 missile, flying low and relatively fast (the pig can not fly super-sonic while at low altitude while the Flanker can hit Mach 2 higher up) will not allow you to avoid being shot down in droves. Modern radar/missile combinations can easilly handle a low flying aircraft, moveing at high, sub-sonic speeds which has a radar cross section the size of a barn. Sending in F-111's alone against any of the regional air forces would be a suicide mission. In the modern battlespace unless you have a comprehensive VLO strike platform like the B-2 or F-117, local air superiority needs to be established for conventional strike platforms (aka the pig) to effecteivly operate in the battlespace. Hence the change in doctrine. Therefore the in real terms F-111's range is useless because it is tied to the escort platforms. For the last 7+ years, our strike range has been limited to the refuled range of our legacy hornet fleet. The reality of the RAAF's situation is the F/A-18C/D HUG hornet is our most potent strike platform, considering its ability to employ J sersies PGMS (JDAM, JDAM-ER) and the Lightning IR targeting pod. The F/A 18F on the other hand can "self escort" effectively. The same (single) platform can establish local air superiority, strike high value well defended targets at stand off ranges, do an accurate battle damage assesment at stand off range, all at further range than a F-111/F-18C package (because F/A 18F has a much larger range than legacy hornets), in addition to being much more survivable than the F-111. It can even act as a taker for other super bugs. As you can see a platforms performance on paper means nothing without considering how it can be used in a realistic environment, and sadly the F-111 is a shadow of the long range striker most of us have loved for the last 3 decades.

left: an F/A-18C, F-111C package
right: an F/A-18D equiped with JDAM-ER

But what about the huge payload advantage i hear you ask? Again reality is somewhat diferent from the comparison on paper. The F-111 can lift and carry some 14300kg of payload in comparison to 8050kg for the F/A-18F, which is pretty impressive. However its realistic payload in an actual strike configuration is not so jaw droping. The F-111 has 5 weapon hardpoints (a spot were you can hang a weapon off the aircraft), one in the weapons bay on the belly and 2 on each wing. When carrying the pigs primary weapon, the Paveway II laser guided bomb, the belly hardpoint is taken by the Pave Tack pod which is needed to identify and lase targets for the LGB's, the outer two wing harpoints are taken by a single AIM 9M self defence missile and a Jamming pod. This leaves the two inboard weapons stations for the Paveways, which are usually 2000lb LGB's. Just two weapons, hardly jaw dropping is it? Even if the F-111 was using its most sophistocated weapon, the 1990's vintage AGM 142 Popeye stand off missile, it would still need a AIM 9M and jamming pod, allowing 3 at most, there is a similar story for the Harpoon anti-ship missile. This load of 2/3 weapons with no BVRAAM capability is juxtaposed to the 11 available hardpoints on the F/A-18F. A strike configuration for a super bug would see two AIM 9X WVRAAM's on the wingtips, an ATFLIR (Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infra Red) pod on one sholder with an AMRAAM on the other, external fuel on the belly and inbound hardpoints (the USN does not use a fuel tank on the same side as the ATFLIR because of the obstructed view but it is unclear as to wether the RAAF will do the same, legacy hornets do use an inboard fuel tank). This leaves 4 hardpoints for a combination of strike weapons, either 4 larger Paveways, JDAM's, JSOW's or Harpoons, or smaller 500lb weapons on double racks. Therefore in real terms super bug brings more weapons to the fight and can strike more targets. In adition to the super bugs payload advantage, it uses much more sophistocated and capable weapons systems. The pigs primary weapons are the Paveway/Pave Tack laser guided bomb combination, the AGM 142 'popeye' stand off weapon and the Harpoon anti ship missile. The super hornet uses paveway and harpoon (although ATFLIR is much more sophistocated, smaller and capable than Pave Tack which was developed in the 1970's), it uses the J series PGM's which are a generation better than anything the pig offeres. The JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Mnition) free fall weapon is a GPS/INS guided weapon whcih has all weather fire and forget capability, with similar accuracy to the paveway series. JSOW (Joint Stand Off Weapon) is a GPS/INS guided glide bomb that offeres the same all weather, fire and forget capability, with extended stand off range and low RCS. Allthough not currently in the RAAF's plans, there is a possibility of JASSM (Joint Air to Surface Stand-off Missile, which is being purchased for the RAAF's legacy hornet and F35 fleet, assuming the missile is compleated) being intergrated onto the F/A-18F. This weapon has 370km+ range, a passive anti shipping capability and very low RCS. These weapons give the super bug a high altitude, stand off, all weather, fire and forget capability which the F-111 can not match.


left: F111C with Pave Tack pod
right: F/A-18F's weapons package

In simple terms the F/A 18F can strike at further range, with more weapons that are more capable than the F-111's, with a much better EWSP suite, and ISR capabilities thanks to the SAR (Synthetic Apature Radar) capabilities of the APG 79 radar. In real terms F/A-18F is a better strike platform. Additionally, the Rhino (super bug) provides us with a world class 4.5th gen air superiority fighter that is significantly more capable than our F/A-18C/D HUG fleet. One has to wonder as to the wisdom of a small to medium sized air force investing in a specialized platform that constitutes a quater of the RAAF's order of battle (ORBAT), which due to the limitations of size is usually the rhelm of large (10+ squadrons) air forces. Multi-role platforms in effect give the RAAF 4 squadrons of air superiority fighters and 4 squadrons of strikers.














Left: ATFLIR pod (left sholder) on an F/A-18C
Right: An AGM-154 C JSOW vertical attack

So why dont we just upgrade the F-111? Well in order for it to be worth it we would need to upgrade the pig to a point were it could self escort (that means BVR missile capability), lower its RCS and IR signature and upgrade its avionics so it can accomidate the latest weapons systems. Basically the aircraft would have to be striped to the bone and a new one rebuilt on its skeliton. Dr Carlo Kopp made such a proposal to the RAAF (which was flatley rejected). It inlcuded, replacing the current radar with the APG 80 (from the F-16E/F), replacing the whole avionics suite with the super hornet's, replace the engines with the F119's from the F22, replace the skin with the Radar Absorbant Material from the F35A, install the IR supression system from the F35 and the engine nozell. Such a drastic upgrade is needed because anything less would be a waste of time. Quite simply this is a bad idea on so many levels i'm not sure were to start. Assuming the US would allow all of these technologies to be purchased, which is doubtfull considering the F-22A export ban, we would effectively be manufacturing a new, orphan, platform. Such an undertaking would incur huge monetary costs (I dont care what APA says about it), and massive completion and budgetary risks for the RAAF and the taxpayer. A much smaller and simpler project has been atempted on the navies seasprite helicopters, were a new avionics and weapons suite has been partially installed in an old airframe. The project is 8+ years late and $500m over budget, and that is practically an order of magnitude LESS complicated and risky than such a huge upgrade of the F-111. And what would we recieve for the massive cost and massive risk to a 1/4 of the RAAF's ORBAT, a longer ranged, supercruising F-111 (which would not change much tactically) with anh RCS the size of a house (instead of a barn), that could to an extent self escort (any AIM 120 carriage would compromise the strike payload), but would still not be able to go toe to toe with an Su-30, which a super bug can. Remember that cost/benifit and risk analysis? If we took this path we would likely have the pigs in the shop for a decade, spending billions, and then end up with a platform thats capabilities are borderline obsolete when compared to the F35. Does that make sense?



F/A-18F Block II vs F-15E Block II

Lets face it, the F-15E Strike Eagle Bk II is a remarkable aircraft and a formidable platform, and like the F-111C paper comparison the Eagle apears to be far better. It can fly further, carry more weight of weapons, self escort, is AESA equiped, has a higher sprint speed and has superior super sonic maneuverability (and has that sex apeal). So why didnt we follow Singapore and South Korea's lead and buy the eagle? To examine the purchase properly, a comprehensive comparison or realistic use and capability is needed, in adition to cost, maintinance requirements, weapons package and risk. In raw performance eagle is a better on paper performer. In combat configuration with AAM's and 4 PGM's, F-15E enjoys a 16% range advantage over the super bug, which equates to 1270km's to 1095km's. Although this is an advantage, in a realistic strike profile both would be equally reliant on AAR (Air to Air Refueling) assets, and due to the nature of a combat strike profiles (the platform would not fly in a streight line and may fly at various altitudes and bearings relative to the target) an extra 200km's may not be as usefull as it sounds, although it is a definite advantage. This range advantage is offset to a degree by the drouge and shoot refuleing system used by the Super Bug, which is more efficent than the boom system used by the Strike Eagle, simply because two platforms can be refuled at once. In terms of payload, an F-15E can indeed put more bombs on target. If carrying a Mk 82 500lb JDAM load, it can carry 12 such weapons in adition to 4 AAM's, which is much more than the 6~8 500lb JDAM's the super bug can cary with a similar AAM & fuel load. However the only time such a load would be carried, and the only time a single platform would need to strike 12 or even more than 4 targets at a time is during a CAS (close air support) mission. However the F/A-18F can carry a lager missile load, with 10~12 AAM's being possible, compared to 8 on the Eagle. The mission the F/A-18F~F-15E is being purchased to fulfill is a regional strategic strike capability curently held by the F-111C which would require a combat load of ~4 PGM's, which both can achieve with external fuel and a sufficient AIM 120D load. They both fulfill this capability better than the F-111C, and can put sufficient stand off PGM's on target at the range required. Kinematically the F-15E is a significantly better performer, with a higher top sprint speed and better thrust to weight ratio. Aerodynamically its a split desision, the F-15E has a lower wing loading (which dictates your turn radius) and is a better performer in the super-sonic and trans-sonic flight regime, however at low speeds, due to the super bugs wing sweep and leading edge wing extentions, the F/A-18F is a much better performer. This is also the case for the very high alfa (angle of attack) performence envilope.












left: F-15E with a JDAM load
Right: an F/A-18E with a Paveway II/Maveric load, note the ATFLIR pod on the left sholder.

It is clear that in raw performance terms the eagle is a better performer, but as discussed in a previous post, the defining factor in BVR combat and SAM survivability is the avionics package. The extraordinary capabilities of the AN/APG 79 radar system have been discussed earlier, however in comparison with the F-15E Bk II this is actually not a real advantage. Part of the package offered to Singapore with its F-15SG purchace was the AN/APG 63(v)3 AESA radar system. The APG 63(v)3 is an entirely new radar system (apposed to the APG 63(v)2 which is simply an AESA antenna on the APG 63(v)1) which Beoing has evolved to a similar state as the APG 79, incorporating its advanced features and modes. The two systmes are comperable in most aspects, so for most the most part the only advantage the F/A-18F holds in terms of detection and track radii, is it LO charecteristics. By no means is F/A-18F a stealth platform, although it has significant LO features that drastically reduce its frontal RCS. It has been claimed to be between 1m2 and .1m2 which is a signifant adavntage over the F-15E Bk II or SU 30. Many F/A-18E/F critics point out that the fact that the super bug carries all of its weapons and external fuel (funnily enough) externally means this advantage is wasted. While this view holds some merit, external weapons mean that only a partial RCS reduction is possible, it still means the super bug will be detected and tracked later, which effectes the who see's who first question (aka, first look, first shot, first kill). The EW suite is comperable, both having fully digital RWR's (the Super Bugs ALR 67(v)4 bieng integrated on all of the RAAF's legacy Hornet fleet improving commonality) with a similar EA capability provided by the AESA radar. The real avionics advantage the F/A-18F holds over F-15E is its fiber-optic data bus, open architecture design allowing COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) prosessing improvements and a "5th generation" combat management system and human interface (which benifited from Boeings work on the JSF programme with the X32). The effect of these 5th generation capabilities combined with the APG 79 and comprehencive EW suite gives the super bug a real advantage over F-15E specifically in the ability to employ these systems and information distribution, even though the AESA radar and EW suite are comperable. They are effectively "force multpliers" for the information gathering and distribution sub-systems and the offencive EW suite, allowing the pilot and RIO/WSO to more effectively employ these capailities and make better tactical desisions.

above: a super bugs coackpit




So from a pure capability standpoint, they are pretty evenly matched contenders, with Strike Eagle holding a small advantage in realistic raw performance (i.e. ability to actually employ performance advantages in real strike profiles) and F/A-18F holding a small advantage in avionics capability. However this is only a small element of decision the making process. The government must balance capability with risk, ease of integration, availability, maintenance considerations and above all cost. From this perspective it is easy to see why F/A-18F was chosen over the F-15E. The F/A-18F Bk II provides 95% of the capability (considering realistic operational configurations and the super bugs comprehensive avionics package) at 60~70% of the acquisition cost (recent acquisition costs for F/A-18E $78.4m, F-15E $108.2m, although the actual price would increase or decrease with the particulars of the agreement), lower maintenace requirements in both manhours and cash, 10% commonality with the RAAF's legacy hornet fleet, a complete weapons package (AGM-84 would have to be integrated on the Strike Eagle at the taxpayers expense adding to the cost and risk) and operating an identicle platform to the USN which allows us to plug into any block upgrade's and utilize the world wide logistics structure in place (F-15AU would be in some respects a unique platform, complicating logistics and maintenance requirements). As for the F/A-18F Bk II not being competitive when facing evolved SU-30 variants, refer to the previous article. In simple terms super bug offers ample capability at significantly less cost, less trouble, less risk with easier maintince and logistics considerations. From a cost/benifit analysis viewpoint F/A-18F is the far superior platform. It may not be the sexiest choice, but it is definatly the smart choice.


A few loose ends...

I just thought I'd address a few points of fact, implications or analysis presented in the programme that I thought was factually wrong, misleading or just plain stupid. This is a statement mad by Wing Commaneder Chriss Mills when refering to the SU-30 "It's a formidable weapon, it can fly higher, faster,.... its got better weapons". In a point of fact that statement is simply false. The Su-30's weapons package is distinctly inferior to the Super Hornet's, in fact even our legacy hornet fleet. The Flankers strike weapons are a generation behind the Hornets, relying on the KAB 500/1500L family of laser guided bombs, KH 29 "Kedge" laser guided missile and KH 59 TV guided missile. All of these systems are of the same technological generation as the F-111C's Paveway/Pave Tack combination. They are simply outclassed by the J series PGM's utilized by the hornet family, which provide an unmatched all weather, fire and forget stand off capability. The only strike weapon used by the Flanker which is even competitive is the KH 31 Krypton anti-ship/anti-radiation missile, with over 100km maximum range, it is a very capable ARM. Its range and kinematics are slightly better than the AGM 88 HARM anti radiation missile although is apparently less capable in terms of ECCM. As for the air to air stuff the situation is the same. The Flankers WVR missile is the R73, which is outclassed kinematically, aerodynamically, in seeker performance, off-broadsight capability, range and IRCCM by the AIM 9X which was specifically designed to outperform the R73. The primary BVRAAM is the R77, which again is completely outclassed by the AIM 120D. AIM 120D is a better performer in terms of range (>180km compared to >90km), ECCM, has a more capable 2 way datalink and better seeker performance. As you can see Super Hornet clearly has a superior weapons package.












left: KH 31 "Krypton" ARH
right: the much troubled but very capable and stealthy AGM 158 Joint Air to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM)

Four Corners "asked" Air Vise Marshal Criss and Wing Commander Mills to do a "hypothetical" simulation of an air strike on Indonesia by a squadron of F/A-18F's in 2012. i can say without hyperbole that this was one of the most ridiculous and unrealistic simulations i have ever seen. Where was JORN or Wedgetail and the information dominance these systems provide? Who in their right mind would use strike profiles designed for a pig, i.e. a low and fast sprint to get to weapons release point when you have a HUGE EW advantage to exploit? There was only one outcome that was going to come out of that "hypothetical" but thank god these men are no longer in running strike missions for the RAAF. Lets look at a more realistic scenario with similar assets: 16 SU 30's are on CAP (combat air patrol) above Java in 4 packets of 4. All of these platforms are tracked by JORN as soon as they took off. A squadron sized package of 16 Super Bug's takes off from RAAF Tindell or RAAF Learmouth for their targets, 4 with a mixed JSOW AAW load and 8 with a full AAW load. They are preceded by a Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft (escorted) and 2 A330 tankers. The Wedgetail sets up shop several hundred kilometers out into the Indian ocean, its radar footprint extending throughout the battlespace, which remains undetected due to the MESA's LPI capability (and the fact that it remains outside of the Flankers/ground based radars detection radii). The 8 AAW equipped super bugs move towards their individual flanker flights as they turn to the north in their orbits, allowing them to stay out of the flankers radar footprint. The pairs of Super Bug's make super sonic runs toward their targets while staying emissions cold, all target information being provided by the Wedgetail via Link 16. When the Bugs reach ~150km from the Flankers they launch missiles, 2 at each Flanker, still emitions cold. At this point the Indonesians may still be unaware they are even being attacked, while there are missiles in the air. As the AMRAAM's leave their hardpoints the flankers are hit with an electronic attack, disrupting their datalinks and severely reducing their radar performance (the SH's EA capability is claimed to be effective in the 150km+ range bracket). While the Indonesian pilots are still trying to figure out why they cant contact command & controll their RWR's light up as the AMRAAM's start pinging. At this stage (within the NEZ and with ample energy) the AIM 120D's kill probability is 90%+, with 2 inbound the chances of survival are minimal. ALL 16 FLANKERS ARE SHOT DOWN. Strike designated bugs move in to weapons release range and hit 16 individual targets throughout centrell Java with JSOW C's. Sound too easy? RAAF picks when to fight and how to fight because it see's the enemy, in addition to effectively blinding him. That is an advantage that no realistic ammount of raw performance will change. That is what information dominance allows you to achieve, and when you bring the ADF's actuall capabilities into the simulation, information dominance is virtually guarenteed.


Conclusion

The 3 major points of contention put foreword by 4 corners and several other commentators have all been addressed above. Even if there is no problem with the structural integrity of the F-111's wing and the DSTO is lying to the public, and only hearsay indicates that is the case, there is a real case for the retirement of the pig simply on return on investment, cost/benefit and availability grounds. Put quite simply its more trouble than its worth. The F/A-18F is a far superior strike platform than the pig, in addition to being a far more capable ISR platform, a far more capable air superiority fighter, far more reliable, far cheaper to run, will achieve far better availability rates and is much more survivable in virtually any scenario. While the F-15E may be slightly more capable in some aspects, the F/A-18F is a much more cost effective solution offering ample capability for less than 70% of the acquisition cost with virtually no extra work or risk. Basically F/A-18F is the right choice for the NACC bridging capability.

This episode of 4 corners was quite simply a shonky, sensationalist and biased piece of journalism which did little more than attack the government by presenting incorrect assumptions and making implications that are at odds with the reality of the platforms concerned and their capabilities. This flawed and politically motivated analysis basically does not stand up to any sort of realistic scrutiny. Hopefully more members of the interested public will look beyond the hyperbole and make a balanced decision based on realistic and logical analysis free from emotional attachment.


Rescources:

ABDR
www.abdr.com.au/data/ADBR-E_Prev.htm

APA
www.ausairpower.net

Four Corners
www.abc.net.au/corners/content/2007/s2073943.htm

Air Power Australia, F/A 18F and the RAAF, a reformed smokers view...

The title says it. The most horrible, dreaded, despicable entity on gods Green earth, a REFORMED SMOKER! Is there anyone more loathsome to pink and black lungs alike? Well that's me, not in the tobacco sense of the word, well actually that's inaccurate, as of last January but that's beside the point. I was once addicted to Carlo Kopp's sweet intellectual smoke, however I have seen the light so to speak and like the good boy I should have all ways been I'm now trying save others from a similar fate. Well, maybe that's a tad melodramatic, I may be off Carlo's band wagon but I'm hardly joining the anti cancer council. My intention isn't to launch a crusade against Air Power Australia and Carlo Kopp, the fact is that he is arguably Australia's most distinguished defense journalist, academic and many of his arguments and pieces of analysis are logical, well balanced and very persuasive. Unfortunately an atmosphere of 'your either with us or against us' has developed throughout defence circles on this issue, which has the effect of stifling constructive criticism of the RAAF future platform choices. This polarization of the issue has occurred on both sides and only shows signs of getting worse. Therefore I'm sure many will jump to the conclusion that this article is all for the "government" and against APA, well that is not its intent. The fact is that much of Air Power Australia's analysis misses a large and vital part of the argument, therefore the conclusions of said analysis can not be balanced. My intent today is to explain the illusive missing element in terms a layman would understand.


Air Power Australia

The website and analytical group Air Power Australia has been a driving force behind much of the controversy surrounding the RAAF's planed future platform acquisitions including an appearance on the 4 Corners program that aired on the ABC network "Flying Blind". All though the website itself has a wide variety of Dr Kopp's work including pieces on Soviet Maritime strike as an example, its primary aim is to promote Dr Kopp's argument regarding the RAAF's platform acquisitions and the supremacy of evolved SU 30 "Flanker" variants over said platforms. This is clearly evident by the pre-eminence of all the articles relating to this discussion, with focus on Su-30, F-35, F-22A and F/A-18E/F analysis. I will summarize Dr Kopp's argument about the survivability and feasibility of the F-18E/F Super Hornet because this is a blog with limited space, the article as a whole can be found in the link provided. According to APA, the significant advantages that evolved "Flanker" variants enjoy over the Super Hornet in kinematic performance (speed and acceleration) and supersonic and sub-sonic maneuverability, outweigh the avionics and missile advantage held by the Super Hornet , even though a fighters radar/missile combination is the dominating factor in BVR (Beyond Visual Range) combat, because of the evolving Russian radar systems:

"In conclusion, the Flanker in all current variants kinematically outclasses Super Hornet in all flight regimes. The only near term advantage the latest super hornets have over legacy flankers variants is the APG79 AESA radar and signature reduction features, an advantage which will not last long given the highly active and ongoing Russian development in these area's"

Air Power Australia
www.ausairpower.net/DT-SuperBug-vs-Flanker.html

This conclusion makes a number of assumptions that are at odds with the reality of international radar development. The AN/APG 79 AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar is widely regarded as one of the most capable fighter sized radars on the planet, with only the AN/APG77 AESA that equips the F/A 22 being comparable at the moment. This 2nd generation AESA (3rd gen ESA) is in full production and operational. Russian AESA radar technology is still in early development phase and is behind European efforts. The Su 30MKI's N011M BARS PESA (Passive Electronically Scanned Array) radar, as capable as it is, due to the limitations of Passive arrays is significantly less capable than the APG 79. The Russian ZHUK-AE AESA radar is being offered with its MiG 35 for India's MRCA competition, however only a mock up has been put in an airframe as yet, therefore it is still in very early development. Currently US AESA development is 2 generations ahead of the rest of the world, and enjoys the higher funding than all of its competitors. To argue, as Dr Kopp does above, that Russian's will produce an AESA radar that is more capable than the APG 79 before a more advanced American model is produced, considering they do not even have a fighter sized test bed working, is dubious to say the least. In order to achieve that the Russians would have to effectively leapfrog several steps in that systems evolution, so several eureka moments would be needed, and personally I dont believe in miracles. In addition to this, F/A-18E/F block 3 is in early development, and is liable to be well into production before a comparable Russian AESA is produced, which you would be safe to assume would be in the order of a decade away. For the Russians to make this "radar lead" good they would effectively have to make up 10 years of development on the Americans with less funding, while Raytheon halted all AESA development.


The AN/APG 79 AESA radar

Dr Kopp also does not address the effect of having a more capable Radar/missile combination in BVR combat, and undoubtedly the combination of the APG 79 radar and the AIM 120D AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile) missile is more capable than the BARS/R77 combination utilized by evolved flankers, notably in detection, track and engagement radii, ECM (Electronic Counter-Measures) & ECCM (Electronic Counter Counter-Measures). The dominating factors in combat at such long ranges are 1) the ability to see your enemy and engage them (your radar/missile/networking combination), 2) Your Electronic Warfare suite, including ESM, EA, ECM & ECCM because of the effect they have on your and your enemy's radar/missile combination (number 1) & 3) Kinematics, the ability to move fast and set the pace of the engagement. F/A-18F has a clear lead in the first two, with Flanker holding the 3rd, and given the ongoing R&D by the US that is unlikely to change. The ability to detect first, track at further ranges, utilize LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) techniques and take longer ranged missile shots is a serious advantage Super Hornet holds over the most advanced Flankers. LPI renders legacy ESM useless and allows the APG 79 to operate with a very low chance enemy receivers would detect its emissions, in comparison to the BARS which would be detected by RWR (radar warning receivers) and ESM well outside of its own detection range. This in effect advertises to everyone in the battle space were and who you are. Perhaps the most interesting and useful additional function of the APG 79 is its EA (Electronic Attack) capability. The radar can focus its emissions onto a single target which in effect, given its power output, makes the radar system very powerful and precise jammer. According to the USN the radar is stated to have EA effects at "extremely significant ranges". This would allow the Super Hornet to blind incoming missiles and perhaps fry their delicate circuits at small enough ranges, degrade enemy radar performance and disrupt data links and communications at stand-off ranges. The EA capability would have a devastating effect on a target if combined with a missile launch. However the radar advantage is offset to an extent by the kinematic advantage that the flanker enjoys, in combination with its inferior but quite capable radar system. It can disengage, it has a smaller NEZ (no escape zone), gives more energy (therefore range) to its own missiles and can to an extent, if it detects the enemy platform before it has launched missiles, set the pace of the engagement. However to argue that this speed & energy advantage renders the super hornet uncompetitive on a one on one basis considering all of the electronic advantages the Super Hornet holds means taking a leap of logic I cant quite make. In my opinion a one on one comparison would indicate they are pretty evenly matched opponents, with the F/A-18F having the BVR advantage thanks to its radar and EW suite, and Su 30 having a small WVR (Within Visual Range) advantage due to its superior instantaneous turn rate. However a one on one comparison is totally unrealistic and therefore irrelevant, which is perhaps the largest flaw in Dr Kopp's analysis.



Left: A Russian Sukhoi SU-30 "Flanker"

Right: An USN F/A 18F Super Bug (Hornet)

Dr Kopp makes a similar argument regarding the F35 Joint Strike Fighter. Basically he argues that Russian development in ESM (Electronic Support Measures), IRST (Infra Red Search & Track) technology and IR guided BVR missiles, coupled with the Flankers superior kinematics will render the F35 uncompetitive due to its lack of comprehensive IR reduction. The F35 is an all aspect VLO (very stealthy) platform equipped with the AN/APG 81 AESA which should be comparable in all aspects to the AN/APG 79, arguably the most sophisticated EW/EWSP (electronic warfare/ EW self protection) suite used on a fighter with raw performance that is "equal or better" than the very agile F16. Effectively even with the advances outlined above, JSF will be able to use an excellent radar, compared to Flanker that will have to rely soley on an ESM cued IRST. Without delving into the details of the advantages of radar vs IRST, in general terms radars are significantly more capable in terms of range, even the most advanced IRST's can only manage a few 10's of kilometers, compared to AESA radars that are stated to have detection ranges in the hundreds of kilometers. IRST's can not see through cloud and they do not give range data which is vital for BVR missile shots. Also IRST's can not perform a volume search like a radar, they in effect have to be cued onto a target by another sensor, hence the need for ESM cuing. Given these inherent limitations of IR based systems, in a one on one encounter, AIM 120D equipped F35's will see first, shoot first and kill first, probably without being detected. However, as I stated earlier, a one on one comparison is irrelevant and unrealistic.

In all of these analysis and comparisons made by Dr Kopp and APA an extremely significant element is missing, and it is perhaps the greatest single factor in 21st century air combat. Information Dominance, a networked battle space and (for lack of a better term) Network Centric Warfare. This is the area which will determine the capability of future air combat, and it is an area were the RAAF is moving ahead in leaps and bounds.

A Networked Battle-space

The concept of "Net Centric Warfare" goes far beyond simply improving situational awareness. Buzz words like Information Dominance can be taken at face value, NCW is far more than the notion that it is good to know more than your enemy. The introduction of high speed, high capacity, unjamable data links like Link 16 are having a drastic effect on the way airborne warfare is waged. More than simply a way to share information, at the squadron level data links act like nerves transmitting information back and forth throughout various platforms. This in effect allows one platform to act as the 'eyes', the others as the 'claws', allowing a squadron to act as a single integrated system rather than a team of individuals. On single fighter level, networking allows the individual platform to detect, track, and fire a missile without ever using its radar, or transmitting a single radio wave. It achieves this by utilizing target information gathered by another platform, either another fighter or AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control) radar aircraft to launch its missiles. The AMRAAM then utilities data linked updates generated from the AEW&C. This allows the AIM 120 AMRAAM to be used as a true "fire and forget" weapon. The AIM 120 family uses an data link update system to keep track of the target throughout its flight path until it gets within range were its small on board radar can take over, which for most ARH (Active Radar Homing) missile's including the R77 is ~20km for a fighter sized target. If the fighter uses its own radar to provide updates it has to continually track the target untill the missile gets close enough to go active which means it has to point its radar at the target which severely limits its options to maneuver. However a networked platform can launch and then turn directly away from the target at high speed, drastically reducing the BVR missile threat. This is in addition to the huge advantages of having an AEW&C platform in the battle space. The adage of seeing first, shooting first and killing first is applicable now more than ever.










Network Centric Warfare/Operations concept

The ADF has been making serious advances in the area of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) and in terms of information dominance, the ADF as a whole and the RAAF in particular are without peer in the region, with the sole exception of Singapore. Improvement of information gathering and distribution has been improved drastically from the first like in the kill chain, early warning, to the last, the missile. Perhaps the most unique and significant achievement made by the Australian defense industry is the over-the-horizon radar network called JORN (Jindalee Operational Radar Network) which has the remarkable range of over 3500km. The system works by using low frequency radio waves (in the HF band) that bounce off the ionosphere, attaining ranges well beyond the horizon. There have been rumors of JORN detecting ballistic missile launches as far away as the middle east. Another project of real significance is the RAAF's Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft. This AEW&C platform utilities Northrop Grumman's revolutionary MESA (Multirole Electronically Scanned Array) radar. The huge AESA radar is stated to have an IFF capability in excess of 500km, an EA capability, very effective ECCM and a comprehensive ESM suite. The RAAF has purchased 6 of these very capable platforms which will become the nucleus of all future RAAF packages. At the platform level with the introduction of F/A-18F all combat platforms will be link 16 compatible, allowing realtime distribution of information and passive AIM 120D launch.














Left : E-737 Wedgetail AEW&C Aircraft
Right: Jindalee Operational Radar Network

The kill chain being built by the ADF will enable the RAAF to dominate any engagement within its sensor footprint regardless of what platform we are facing. The JORN system will detect any single aircraft within a truly massive footprint across the whole Indonesian archipelago and beyond. This will allow the RAAF to always fight on our own terms, grant extended warning time for any inbound strike packages and detect maritime threats well beyond the Australian coastline. The next link in the kill chain down from JORN, Wedgetail will provide weapon targeting quality track data at stand off ranges, which will be distributed to the individual platform via Link 16 (either F18C/D HUG, F18F or F35A) which can make passive, maximum range missile launch at inbound targets. A networked squadron sized package means that the qualities of the individual fighter become less important. The fighter does not use its radar and is effectively a missile barge, which transport's AIM 120D's to launch points for the Wedgetail. The massive advantage this grants the RAAF against any opponent without a similar information gathering and distribution network will effectively mean that an equal force of F 18C HUG's will be able to decisively defeat an equal force of advanced Flanker variants, which on a one on one basis are much more capable, hence the irrelevance of one on one platform analysis. In fact one would be safe to assume that if an RAAF squadron was equipped with evolved Flanker variants, it would decisively defeat a comparable enemy formation of F/A 18F's without a similar integrated information distribution system. With other nations in the region pursuing a networked force structure with AEW&C, the importance of offensive Electronic Warfare, or the ability to disrupt enemy datalinks or degrade radar performance becomes vital. The sophisticated offensive EW capability of the FA/-18F Block 2 will give the RAAF an EW capability unmatched in the region. An interesting development of the F/A18F airframe is the EA 18G Growler kit that can be procured for the F18F airframe. The EA 18G is a dedicated EW platform which is significantly more capable in terms of electronic warfare than the baseline Super Bug Block 2. Fitted with the ALQ 99 EW system, this platform will allow the user to significantly degrade enemy radar performance and disrupt their network at very significant ranges, in addition to SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) work. Australian Aviation magazine published an article stating that the RAAF had shown interest in 8 EA-18G's in addition to a further 24 F/A-18F's. Whether or not this is the case there does seem to be a low level of interest in the system. The ability of the F/A 18F block 2 to disrupt enemy networks ensures the the huge lead the RAAF has in information dominance remains intact. The effectiveness of this integrated system including land based early warning, AEW&C, and platform will enjoy a quantum leap in capability once the F35 is introduced. When you add an LO platform into the mix you can achieve a passive, long range, undetected launch even withing the surveillance footprint of an enemy AEW&C platform. This will truly allow the RAAF to exploit it's lead in information dominance, by denying the enemy the use of their radar, and no amount of raw performance will make that deficit good.










Left: F35A Joint Strike Fighter
Right: EA 18G Growler EW Aircraft


The platform comparison championed by Dr Kopp seems to only take the capabilities of the individual platform into account, however the generic capabilities of the platform are only a small part of determining who wins. Only a system/organizational wide comparison is relevant because fighters will not act as single systems in the future, only a comparison of AEW&C, platform , EW capability and doctrine is applicable. Now considering that pretext, perhaps the best way of evaluating a platform should not be platform X's capability vs platform Y's capability, but what platform X brings to your order of battle that complements the whole system. In the case of F/A18F, the long range, versatility, huge ISR capabilities, integrated sensor suite, sophisticated weaponry and electronic warfare/electronic attack capability all perfectly complement the system the ADF is building.

In conclusion, the information gathering and distribution system being built for the ADF will allow the RAAF to defeat any realistic Flanker equipped threat with legacy F/A-18C/D HUG's, and with the introduction of F/A-18F and F-35A Australia's air dominance "edge" will be sharper than it has ever been. The RAAF's rapidly evolving EW capability will effectiveness disrupt and disable any enemy information distribution systems, and in conjunction with the introduction of a stealth fighter as its primary platform, information dominance over any conceivable threat is virtually ensured. When all the pieces of this air defense system are in place, which should be in the middle of 2010, the RAAF will be able to decisively defeat any conceivable threat within our massive sensor footprint, and unless the Russians market a comprehensive VLO fighter (which is very, very unlikely), the individual qualities of the threat platform will do nothing to change that fact. Therefore any notion that an F/A-18F which is part of the wider RAAF integrated air defense system will not be competitive with an evolved SU-30 Flanker is frankly at odds with the reality of 21st century aerial warfare.

Dr Kopp continually uses analogies with World War 2 and Vietnam in his analysis, including comparisons between the F35A and the F104 Thundercheif, or between the F-22A and P38. In my personal opinion I didn't find either of these apt comparisons for the current platforms and choices. Perhaps a more pertinent analogy from the past is the battle of the Philippine Sea. 375 aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy were shot down for the loss of only only 41 USN fighters. The critical factor in perhaps the most lop sided and decisive victory in the history of air combat was not the qualities of the platforms or pilots involved, the Germans never suffered anything of that magnitude and they were flying obsolete ME-109's with inferior pilots. What led to the great "Marianas turkey shoot" was the fact that it occurred within the USN's radar footprint. Every single strike package was tracked then intercepted by fighters which thanks to radar control enjoyed the altitude and positional advantage. In effect the USN achieved complete information dominance, and that is precisely what the RAAF/ADF is doing right now.


I know this is at odds with what i have argued before. Those who are familiar with Defence Talk Forum would be well aware of that. As i stated earlier, I'm a reformed smoker so to speak. However when you have seen both sides of the argument, you tend to have a more balanced view on things, and given the polarization of this issue, a logical, balanced analysis without an agenda can be hard to find. I hope that's what I provided here.