Economic Power as a Geopolitical Tool

Economic power has, since the dawn of civilization, been a foundation of the nation state’s standing amongst its neighbors. Indeed economic activity and in particular trade with neighboring nations is a fundamental element of society as we know it, from small tribal villages to the WTO. Thus the ability to wield trade and economic dependency as a tool of both soft power in times of peace or the erosion of war fighting capacity in times of conflict is something that has been an essential part foreign policy for time immemorial. Today in times of relative geo-political stability and an established security order, gaining economic leverage in order to achieve strategic results is becoming the favorite weapon of the world’s great rising powers. The state owned mega-corporations Gazprom of Russia and Chinalco of China have become the long arms of their respective owners, implementing policy of not only economic benefit but geo-strategic division and long term disruption of the established security order. Apparently in the world of a lone superpower and a single dominant alliance system “economic warfare” has become new great power battleground, and in a globalized economy it is fast becoming one of the most challenging.


Russia, Gazprom and West


Russia is perhaps in the unique position as the only contemporary ex superpower in existence. Just two short decades ago the Soviet Union enjoyed the most powerful conventional military forces on the planet, with the economic and political influence that enjoyed hegemonic domination over half the globe. Thus it may seem to be a bit of a paradox to label Russia as a rising power. Certainly the short period of time spent out of the superpower league stands in stark contrast to the other rising powers such as China and India, neither of which have ever enjoyed true great power status on a global scale. However Russia’s geo-strategic situation today shares much in common with India or China, and the old Bear is desperate to shake off the daemons of the 1990’s and reassert her position alongside the other global powers. Unable to challenge the west militarily, Russia has turned to economic leverage as a tool to challenge NATO’s eastward expansion into Russia’s cold war sphere of influence. In addition to the rapid economic growth these moves have provided, the policy of economic “divide and conquer” is clearly visible in the Russian Government and Gazprom’s actions over the last five years.


Gazprom was created during the last days of the Soviet Union as a state run natural gas ministry, which soon became a state owned company and Russia’s largest energy producer. Privatized during the frantic and chaotic reforms initiated by Boris Yeltsin, Gazprom appeared to be on the path to western style privatization, albeit with strict ownership controls. The company posted a loss in 1999 amid controversy over internal accounting policies and a deteriorating natural gas transportation system. During the Putin administration’s reign Gazprom was effectively nationalized with the government obtaining a controlling share under the guise reducing restrictions on share ownership criteria. Gazprom moved quickly to tap into the vast western markets the thawing of the cold war had opened up, and in the blossoming of east west economic relationships Gazprom positioned itself as the primary natural gas supplier to the EU, with cheap abundant reserves and several overland pipelines. The relationship fostered between the growing EU and Gazprom was initially quite productive, with little Russian government interference or apparent politicization of management.


Only after the Russian government gained a controlling share in Gazprom was Putin able to effectively wield the massive economic power the energy relationship with Europe provided. By 2006 Gazprom provided most the natural gas to eastern Europe and a significant share to Germany and France, and while it remained in Russia’s economic interest to not allow anything to disrupt the relationship, the economic dependency on an authoritarian and increasingly assertive Russia was not something that sat easily with many Europeans, and it was in a dispute with Belarus that Russia began to flex her economic muscles.


During the 1990’s Russia continued her subsidization of eastern European gas supplies, leading to a huge price disparity between gas sold to Western Europe and the former Soviet block. In 2006 Russia signaled an abrupt shift to this policy by tripling the price it demanded from Belarus per cubic meter of gas, although this level was still far below what western Europeans played. A longstanding dispute over oil erupted between the two nations, with Belarus imposing a tariff on oil transited to Western Europe. Belarus may have been the instigator of this dispute; however the action taken by Russia was both drastic and far reaching. Initially Gazprom threatened to cut off all Natural Gas flowing through Belarus, which entailed a significant impact for the rest of Europe situated downstream. On January 8 2007, Russia actually cut off oil supplies running through Belarus. This was the first indication that Russia would use its monopoly over supply to achieve strategic results and capitulation by a smaller power. However worse was to come, and the economic battlefield would be in the Ukraine.


A very similar story ran its course in the Ukraine. Long enjoying subsidized natural gas prices, in 2006 the Ukraine was faced with a similar price hike. In the resulting dispute Gazprom stopped supplies moving through Ukraine, leaving much of eastern and central Europe without heating in the grips of winter. The Russians claimed that Ukrainian companies had been siphoning gas out of the pipeline that was intended for other European customers. Whether or not this is the case the Russian reaction was telling and dramatic, a dispute with the Ukraine led to severe economic and personal pain for Eastern Europe and its people. Russia demonstrated to Europe that it would not hesitate to cut off hydrocarbon supplies over a rather minor economic dispute with the Ukraine. Eastern Europe awoke to the reality that its massive dependence on Russian natural gas supplies was akin to an economic sword of Damocles hanging, now rather precariously, over their heads.


To make things worse in August of 2008 Russia invaded her neighbor in the South Caucuses, Georgia, with the pretext of Georgian aggression in its breakaway province of South Ossetia. This action had two primary consequences for Eastern and Central Europe;

1. Russia demonstrated that it could mount significant military campaigns within the former soviet union, (with almost no justification), and the west would do nothing of value to help.
   
2. The only other major natural gas supply diversification option for Eastern Europe is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). This multinational pipeline project is designed to connect the central Asian Hydrocarbon fields to the European market, without passing through Russian territory. With no other feasible Natural Gas supplies and no immediate alternatives to natural gas, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (and to a smaller extent Central Europe) have a choice between several Russian pipelines or the South Caucasus Pipeline. However the SCP passes through Georgia on its way from the Caspian to the Black Sea, terminating on the black sea port of Supsa. Currently the SCP only transports oil however a natural Gas component is planned. SCP infrastructure was heavily targeted by Russian air power during the conflict, severely degrading the emplaced infrastructure.
   

Thus, although the August war failed to bring a Russian friendly regime to power in Tibilisi (which would have given Moscow control of the SCP by proxy), the Russians both demonstrated their ability to interdict the only other major pipeline system in operation in Eastern Europe, with only a minimal pretext and without direct western intervention (and disrupted the pipeline already in place). Now Eastern and Central Europe are faced with the situation that a strategically critical energy supply are controlled virtually by a single power, one that has demonstrated its ability and intent to disrupt energy supplies under its direct control for political reasons, and use military force to interdict diversification options. In short, Eastern Europe’s (and to a lesser extent Central Europe’s) energy security is dependant on the prevailing mood in the Kremlin.


The strategic implications of this economic dependency are fourfold:

1. Hydrocarbon supplies provide Moscow with a lever that can be used to apply pressure on Eastern Europe very effectively, a geographical region that Moscow sees as vital to its future security. It is a primary strategic objective for Moscow to push her influence as far west as possible due to the lack of a geographical anchor for her borders on the North European plane.
2. The partial dependency of major European powers such as Germany on Russian natural gas buys Moscow more room to maneuver in the former Soviet Union. If Moscow plans on any other military operations in Central Asia or the Caucasus the Germans and Eastern Europeans will be less willing to press the issue, lest their energy supplies be jeopardized. Neither the Germans nor the Eastern Europeans will be likely to get significantly involved either politically, economically or militarily if Russia were to repeat the war with Georgia elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Thus this increases the Russians military options before it meets serious resistance from the Europeans. Germans are unlikely to go cold over Turkmenistan or Tajikistan.
3. Given the above point, European energy dependence goes to achieving another Russian strategic objective, the destabilization of NATO. As Russia continues to reassert itself in the former Soviet Union the Anglo-Saxon powers are sure to resist, however its the central European powers with something to loose and very little to gain from confronting Russia in central Europe or the Caucuses. Although a Central Asian conflict would not affect NATO directly, the difference in policy response between the continental European powers and the Anglo-Saxon block will. If the Russians apply pressure in far eastern Europe and the Baltic states Germany will also be less inclined to intervene than the Anglo Saxon block, and that could cause a significant rift (there are more reasons than energy security for Germany’s apathy towards another confrontation with Russia).
4. Energy supplies provide Russia with the ability to destabilize the current regime in Kiev. The Ukraine is strategically vital to Russia, and Russia proper would be nye indefensible if the Ukraine was allowed to join a western alliance. Thus destabilization and eventual overthrow of the current pro western regime in Kiev is an immediate strategic objective for Moscow, and the use of energy supplies provides a very powerful lever as it dramatically effects the lives of every day Ukrainians.
   

Clearly the use of economic levers has become the primary mechanism used by Moscow to achieve strategic goals in Eastern Europe, in addition to providing the political space to allow more direct methods to be utilized.


China, Chinalco and Australia


The Peoples Republic of China (PROC) and the Commonwealth of Australia have enjoyed a long standing and mutually beneficial economic partnership for almost 30 years. The massive Chinese economic expansion that has been driven by cheap exports to western markets has funded a massive industrialization process. Driven by a massive need for raw materials, PROC looked for a partner who could assure regular supply in a geographically location. Australia fit the bill perfectly. The economic boom that the world enjoyed in the first 8 years of this century drove Chinese expansion at a dizzying pace, which pushed commodity prices to all time highs. River’s of Chinese money flowed into Canberra’s coffers as incredibly profitable commodity contracts supercharged the Australian economy, with sustained 4.5% Real GDP growth rates. By 2008 the Australian GDP reached the $1AUD trillion mark. Although the mining sector only account for ~5% of Australia’s GDP, the massive profitability of commodity contracts meant that the multiplier effect of these exports was significantly enhanced.


This burgeoning economic relationship had significant strategic implications however. Since world war two Australia has been closely aligned with the U.S., the latter being Australia’s ultimate security guarantor. Australia is part of the “ABC” alliance group, meaning Australia, Britain & Canada. This “Anglo-Saxon block” is the U.S.’ closet alliance structure, receiving privileged technology transfer and intelligence sharing opportunities. Australia is one of two key US allies in the Asia Pacific region, anchoring the US’ southern flank in the region with Japan in the north. These two alliances are the cornerstone of the US position in the western pacific, with two modern, wealthy, dynamic, competent and capable partners at the north and south ends of Asia. This alliance system provides the US with the ability not only to geographically dominate the entire pacific but act as the geographical anchor to any containment strategy for rising East Asian powers.


The US-Aus alliance is why China’s economic relationship with Australia is important on a strategic level. Ever since Australia realigned from strategic dependency on the UK to the US its economic interests have not been aligned with its security relationships. Prior to 1939, the single largest market for Australian exports was the UK and its empire in the Indian Ocean basin. Thus retaining access to markets in the UK was economically vital to Australia, and why it deployed very large forces (per capita) to defend the Suez Canal in both world war one and world war two. Australia’s primary security partner, the UK, was also its largest economic partner. However once Australia’s principle security partner became the US its economic interests diverged from its security interests. Australia is a recourse exporter, so is the US. Thus the guarantor of its security is also an economic competitor.


Now Australia’s largest export markets are no longer British dominions but Japan and China, the great Asian product exporters. The relationship with Japan is strategically benign because Japan and Australia are part of the same alliance system. The relationship with china has the potential to be destabilizing however, simply because the US and China are competitors. From a security viewpoint, Australia has become the southern anchor to the US’s containment of China. The Australian sphere of influence (Indonesia, Papua New Guinea & Oceania), which is becoming more pronounced as Australia’s national power continues to grow, acts as natural buffer for growing Chinese influence. Wherever China seeks security and economic relationships within Australia’s sphere of influence it will find already standing and long established security, political and economic relationships with Australia as the regions leading power. Additionally Australia provides the US a secure base to interdict the Melaka Straights and conduct operations in South East Asia in the event of a shooting war with China. Thus the Australian alliance is very valuable to Washington. Conversely Australia has far more to gain economically from China than it does from the US. This contradiction between Australia’s security and economic relationships is a significant vulnerability in the U.S’s alliance system, particularly as that economic relationship continues to grow.


And it has been growing of late. After the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the global recession that followed many Australian mining companies have been experiencing significant financial difficulties, primarily due to the inability of some firms to find adequate credit in the post Lehman Brothers credit environment, and also due to the collapse in commodity prices. Seeing an opportunity to increase economic influence in Australia, and improve their market position various state owned Chinese mineral companies have either invested in or attempted to invest in Australian mining companies. An example is the $1.2 Billion AUD purchase of OzMinerals’ mining facilities in South Australia by the Chinese government owned MinMetals. The largest economic move by Beijing was the proposed $19.5 Billion USD investment in Rio Tinto by Chinese recourse giant Chinalco (also state owned). If the deal had gone through it would have given Chinalco a significant market advantage, considering Rio Tinto and Chinalco enjoy a customer/supplier relationship. Economically the investment would have been a very good one for Chinalco and PROC, from that point on Chinalco’s bargaining position would have been far stronger during contract negotiations, and Rio would have been effectively locked into the Chinalco relationship. However Rio walked away from the deal after strong public and shareholder opposition to the proposal, it is possible that the Australian government could have vetoed the deal on national interest grounds.


While the Chinalco deal made great economic sense to the Chinese it also served significant strategic interests. Increasing economic ties between China and Australia, while improving the Chinese position in the relationship simultaneously, increases the potential for dissention within the US’ political alliance structure. Let me qualify this, if there was a major, multi theatre regional conflict between the two powers it is inconceivable that Australia would not enter on the side of its closest ally with its full capability.


However that is not the most likely conflict scenario in East Asia. In a small and limited conflict over Taiwan, after the cessation of hostilities (and likely Chinese defeat) China and the U.S would have powerful economic incentives to return to reasonably amicable relations. Without the US market Chinese exports will have to destination (a disastrous outcome for the Chinese Communist party and the nations territorial integrity), and the US will loose mountains of Chinese investment and cheap imports. Thus the symbiotic and critical economic relationship they have will compel both sides to resume semi-normal economic interaction almost immediately. China would not be in a position to punish the US economically (they have more to loose). However Australia is much more vulnerable. Although hardly crippling economically, the loss of Chinese export contracts would have significant and tangible effects on GDP and employment in Australia. It is likely that the extremely profitability of the recourse sector has been responsible for the above trend growth seen in the last 10 years. This could amount to between $5 billion AUD and $10 billion AUD p.a. at current prices when the multiplier effect is considered, at the upper end almost half to Australia’s aggregate defence spend. For a conflict in which no vital Australian interests are at stake, Australia would pay a heavy price for its involvement in the defence of Taiwan.


Therefore it is likely that the US may not count on military assistance from one of its closest allies in a high intensity conflict against an able foe in their geographical area. It is at least reasonable to assume hesitation on Canberra’s part to enter the conflict, considering the cost. Deepening this relationship means widening the gap between Australia’s security interests and its economic interest, which will increase the possibility that Australia will not intervene in a conflict over Taiwan and not peruse as committed a containment strategy as would have been the case other wise.


Conclusions

Clearly the massive government owned enterprises in the two potentially antagonistic rising global powers are being used as instruments of state power, and although the use is typically more obvious in the case of Russia, both nations are perusing wider geostrategic goals. Of course this phenomenon is not limited to rising powers; the west has been using similar tactics for decades. The US effectively controls the global trade system through global naval domination, and has the ability to exclude any nation from free global trade. When it exercises this power it is usually through U.N. sanctions, however only the USN has the ability to enforce sanctions on a global scale.


However this is usually a use of military force under a UN banner, the west rarely uses economic dependence of potential enemies in the manner Moscow and Beijing do. This is a dramatic shift from the cold war, where the eastern and western blocks were totally economically independent, with very little economic interaction between the two. In the new era of globalization and the global economy, economic interaction provides significant opportunities for traditional geopolitical maneuvers which would have been backed by military force in the past. In real terms Russia posses very little threat to Germany, but through Natural Gas supply manipulation Russia has the ability to move Berlin’s position. Additionally China posses very little realistic threat militarily to Australia, particularly an Australia what is part of the US block, however with the ability to turn off the tap of Chinese money Beijing has the ability to heavily influence policy in Canberra. Of course that does not suggest Russia can invade Poland without a German reaction, or China can establish naval bases or launch amphibious campaigns in Indonesia or Papua without an Australian militarily reaction, nevertheless it does afford them more options.


Additionally it must be said that the economic relationship between Gazprom and Eastern Europe or Chinalco and Australia has been initiated with the objective of providing government with an economic lever. Russia had Natural Gas, Europe needed it, Australia had minerals, and China needed them. However these state owned corporations are instruments of state power, make no mistake. And while perusing economic objectives, geopolitical objectives can also be achieved.


These consequences of economic interaction must be assessed by policymakers when economic decisions are made. Global economics is now a battlefield between the major global power blocks, in a way it has never been before. This is clearly a consequence of the massive military inferiority any power has under the US, and another asymmetrical form of exercising state power.

Power Projection in the Twenty First Century: Lessons to be learned?

Throughout history governments have required the ability to project both hard and soft power well beyond their borders, and almost without exception naval force has been the most capable power projection tool available. Those same requirements still stand today. At the dawn of the twenty first century the nature of naval power projection and the equipment and doctrine needed to achieve it stand at somewhat of a crossroads, with the assumptions that have underpinned western naval procurement for the last twenty years undergoing extensive reexamination. The threat matrix facing western navies is now evolving rapidly, and naval strategists and procurement planners are racing to catch up. Was the “littoral centric” procurement program launched by the USN warranted given the evolving nature of naval power projection and the rise of potential blue water competitors? Is the RAN justified in investing so much in amphibious capability and assets to protect it while relatively neglecting offensive counter maritime and strike assets? In this article I will examine both the USN’s and the RAN’s procurement choices as both strive to adapt to the changing requirements of naval power projection in the twenty first century.

The USN and the Littoral Environment

The end of the cold war left the USN without the primary set of strategic requirements that had dominated procurement and doctrine; the need to protect the Atlantic sea lines of communication. No longer did the USN have to devote massive resources to a large frigate force intended to escort convoys to Europe. Over night the threat matrix facing the USN and the organizations primary role dramatically altered, with the lone superpower now taking on the role of global peacemaker. However the US fleet was not properly equipped for this role, with a large destroyer and frigate fleet designed for blue water operations. If the USN was to be the White House’s “big stick” in far flung corners of the globe the massive blue water capability appeared to be largely redundant. It was assumed that only dominating the littorals would allow the USN military to intervene in, coerce or militarily dominate lesser powers in strategically vital but distant locations. With no apparent blue water challenger in the 1990’s the full focus of procurement and R&D shifted to green water capability.

This “littoral centric” view of procurement and doctrine that dominated the USN during the 1990’s is apparent in a wide range of programs: the conversion of Ohio class SSBN’s to SSGN’s, the Littoral Combat Ship program and the DD(X) program are perhaps the most well known. The only major blue water design and procurement program initiated in the 1990’s was the CVN(X) next generation carrier, and although DDG-51 procurement continued that program was thoroughly rooted in the cold war. Clearly the USN had relegated blue water capability to the “backburner” in terms of research, development and procurement.

The LCS is a small, fast, lightweight and inexpensive platform designed to operate effectively in the littoral environment. Its modular “mission package” system allows the LCS to perform a wide variety of roles with “plug in and fight” mission components giving it some blue water capability. The planned fifty five ship LCS fleet will be a vital component to the USN’s “313 ship navy” concept[1] and will allow the USN to operate with much greater flexibility in the littoral environment[2]. With a top speed in excess of forty knots the LCS is intended to move quickly into littoral environments dominated by smaller nations, deploy Special Forces, lay or hunt mines and provide small units deployed on shore with indirect fire support. The platform is optimized for this role with only minimal air defence capability and small ca

liber naval guns[3]. The only potential blue water capability this class will posses will be in the ASW role, with the ASW mission package and a deployed MH-60 providing a partial ability to prosecute SSN/K/G threat in deep water. Clearly the bulk of the blue water ASW load will be taken up by the DDG-51 fleet due to its significantly superior sensor suite and ASW weapons fit. The LCS will provide the USN with a level of flexibility and speed of response in the littoral environment that the FFG-7 or DDG-51 simply could not.

Left: LCS 1, Freedom Right: LCS 2 Independence

The other major development and procurement program currently underway is the DD(X) program and its product the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer. The DD(X) program was intended to fulfill the Marine Corps’ requirement for naval fire support which the USN lost when it retired the Iowa class battleships in the early 1990’s. The DDG-1000 is a littoral optimized vessel, with a dual band (X and S band) radar designed to track small targets in high clutter, in shore environments, significant Radar Cross Section reduction measures and the 155mm/6 inch Advanced Gun System, firing rocket assisted Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) Precision Guided Monition’s with a maximum range of 60nm[4]. While the DDG-1000 is a guided missile destroyer, it was never intended to fulfill the area air defence role that the DDG-51 fulfils today, which is a limitation in blue water scenarios. Additionally the DDG-1000’s sonar is heavily optimized for operating in the littoral environment. While the DDG-1000’s sensors, weapons, and RCS reduction will allow the platform to operate very effectively in well defended littoral environments, this optimization limits the platforms flexibility.

Left: DDG-1000 Right:DDG-51

The DDG-1000 has been one of the more controversial naval procurement program in modern times, attracting extensive attention from the Congressional Budget Office and the press. The many revolutionary aspects of the DDG-1000’s design, such as its significant RCS reduction measures and dual band radar, entail a hefty research and development price tag with a $6.6 Billion USD procurement cost for the first vessel. After years of staunch defence of the DDG-1000 program, before the Sea power and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee in July 2008, the USN announced that it no longer intended to procure any additional Zumwalt class destroyers past the three already funded but requested funding for an additional DDG-51 with the possibility of a further eight[5]. The Marine Corps consider the DDG-1000’s Naval Fire Support mission as critical, however the Navy contends that more than adequate fire support can be provided by airborne platforms, rocket assisted 5 inch munitions and organic marine fires. The USN sighted the increased blue water threats of air launched anti ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles defence and proliferation of blue water capable conventional submarines, and the DDG-1000’s deficiency when facing this altered threat matrix, as the major rational behind the decision to resume DDG-51 production.

The decision to “truncate” the DDG-1000 to 3 vessels and resume DDG-51 production is the first step away from a littoral centric mindset that has dominated USN strategic thinking for the last fifteen years. It seems that this dramatic about face was attributable to more than a proliferation of SSK’s and the increased need for BMD that had developed in the previous 2 years. Evidently the mid term threat to the USN’s dominance of the worlds blue water by the rise of new Asian powers has been a major factor in the platforms selection. The increased threat of ballistic missiles clearly refers to the significant strides continental Asian powers are making in converting these weapons for anti ship use. The massive investment in green water operations that are invariably asymmetric in nature and facing a lesser power, which the DDG-1000 represents, is clearly a “niche” expenditure that detracts from the USN’s blue water capability. Now with an increased threat to the USN’s ability to operate outside of the littorals procurement has shifted to more flexible platforms.

The RAN, the AWD and the “Fat Ships”

In 2007, Australia was the fifth largest user of commercial shipping in the world. The geographic circumstances and economic structure that Australia must contend with create an almost unparalleled reliance on Sea Lines of Communication and the economic link they provide. Thus the concept of sea control is a matter of economic life and death for RAN and ADF as a whole. The ability to control the areas of ocean that function as Australia’s economic link to the rest of the world, and if need be deny that to an enemy, may be Australia’s realistic centre of gravity in any major conflict. The long and bloody battle for Guadalcanal in 1942 was fought by the U.S. in order to maintain those vital links to her ally. However this need to defend commercial shipping routs in high intensity warfare has taken somewhat of a back seat in procurement programs in the last ten years, with a heavy emphasis on amphibious lift and power projection. While the RAN is not investing heavily in such specialized vessels as the LCS or DDG-1000, the emphasis is clearly on the more visible elements of maritime power projection such as extremely capable Air Warfare Destroyers and Large Amphibious Ships.

The need for an area air defence solution for the RAN was outlined under Project SEA 4000, the Air Warfare Destroyer program. The previous destroyer possessed by the RAN was the Perth (Charles F. Adams) class DDG which were approaching obsolescence at their 1990’s retirement date. The area air defence need was partially fulfilled by the Adelaide FFG-7 class guided missile frigate (Oliver Hazard Perry class) however this solution never replaced the capability lost with the Perth Class retirement in contemporary terms. The chosen design from the SEA 4000 project is an Australian derivative of the Spanish F-100 Alvaro de Bazan class frigate. Equipped with the SPY-1D(v) phased array radar and Aegis combat system, the F-100 will provide a true quantum leap for the RAN in terms of area air defence capability[6].

Left: The Hobart class AWD

The replacement of the LPA’s HMAS Kanibla and HMAS Manoora under Project JP 2048 phase 4a resulted in the selection of the largest vessels ever acquired for the RAN, the 27,000 ton Canberra Class LHD’s. Each of the Canberra class LHD’s will be capable of moving a mechanized battalion group, complete with M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, self propelled or towed artillery, Ground Based Air Defence units, combat engineers, signals companies and logistics assets in addition to a mixture of between ten to twenty four attack and lift helicopters. The ability to move a complete battalion group allows a single Canberra class LHD to deploy a fully sustainable, complete force well beyond Australian shores, a capability comparable to the RAN’s entire current sea lift capacity. The two ships will be able to deploy the best part of a fully equipped mechanized brigade.

Left: The Canberra class LHD

According the defence white paper published in 2000, the secondary and tertiary roles of the ADF in terms of strategic importance are the promotion of stability in the south pacific and Indonesia and the common defence of South-East Asia[7]. Both of these strategic requirements require the ability to project hard power away from Australian shores. These requirements, in addition to ongoing contributions to global security, are the driving strategic focus for the acquisition of the Canberra class LHD’s and Hobart class DDG’s. These platforms are intended to allow the ADF to deploy heavy forces around the south pacific quickly and effectively with adequate organic capability within the battalion group/brigade. The common defence of South East Asia could well see the deployment of a brigade in amphibious operations in the face of hostile air and anti ship cruise missile capability, requiring first tier area air defence provided by the Hobart class DDG’s. Clearly the primacy of the defence of Australia scenario that had dominated Australian thinking has been abandoned post 2000, as the major naval procurement initiatives launched in the first decade of the twenty first century are all tools of power projection.

Lessons to learn?

The dynamic nature of power projection and the strategic landscape has created an extremely challenging situation for naval strategist’s and procurement planners to contend with over the last fifteen years. The lack of a clear blue water threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ascension of the U.S. to the role of global policeman in the security vacuum that followed lead to a dramatically different set of operational requirements for the early twenty first century, a set of requirements not seen in modern history. No global contender to US naval capability and the need to operate in the littoral environment effectively when facing lesser, although often well armed powers in strategically vital locations. Such an emphasis on expeditionary warfare without a credible blue water threat is reminiscent of the Royal Navy’s role between the world wars.

The littoral centric mindset that seems to have gripped the USN is perhaps understandable given the organizational drive to evolve after the cold war. Post 1990 the USN would face small states in widely dispersed theatres, and in every case it would have the task of maintaining or restoring the established security order. The new operational environment drove the new operational paradigm, and the result is the littoral optimized vessels such as the DDG-1000 and LCS. These vessels are a reaction to a perceived strategic environment, and both will allow the USN to operate with virtual impunity in the littorals in the vast majority of scenarios. However the question remains as to why the USN is abandoning the DDG-1000 and acquiring previous generation DDG-51’s if these vessels are so well suited to the operational environment that the USN was bound to face in the post Cold War era?

The RAN faced a similar shift in its strategic landscape, but the collapse of the Soviet Union had little impact. The major shift in Australia was Canberra’s realization that the nations security did not just lay in ensuring any potential adversary could not operate freely in the northern approaches. Indeed the sea denial strategy that was utterly dominant in the late 1980’s and 1990’s still remains as the critical element to the defence of Australia; however it is now the option of last resort. The common defence of South East Asian friends and allies would likely be where any battle for Australia would be fought, and even though the use of friendly bases is assumed, the ability to deploy forces in the face of a credible air threat far from Australia becomes paramount. That capability, in addition to improved global reach, drove the acquisition of a world class air defence capability and massively increased amphibious capacity.

However this adaptation to an evolving strategic requirement may have been short sighted. The arguably myopic, fifteen to twenty year limited view held by the USN and RAN has lead to a situation, particularly in Washington, where procurement choices are racing to catch up with the evolving threat matrix, and falling back on legacy platforms to do so. After billions of dollars invested in what is undoubtedly the world’s most capable destroyer sized vessel the mighty DDG-1000 has been relegated to the abyss of a technology demonstrator. This is the price the USN is paying for its myopic focus on the littoral operational environment; the construction of legacy platforms because next generation systems are too optimized and inflexible to adapt to a changed threat matrix and strategic requirements. Undoubtedly the technology equipping the DDG-1000 is, on average, far more capable than that equipping the DDG-51; however the lack of blue water capability which could have easily been included in the design stage has rendered the platform virtually redundant. With only two options the USN has no choice but to continue production of previous gen platforms.

The ADF is in danger of repeating similar mistakes. The acquisition of an Aegis capability and the massive increase in sea lift will improve the RAN’s ability to project power globally, in line with the government’s requirements. However since the commissioning of the sixth Collins Class SSG there has been no real investment in counter maritime or ASW capability. The Hobart Class DDG’s will dramatically improve the RAN’s air defence potential, however the platforms maritime strike capacity is broadly capable to an ANZAC class FFH, and its ASW capability is not dramatically superior. The ADF’s single most capable maritime strike and ASW asset is without doubt the Collins class SSG, yet the government did not exercise its option for a further two platforms or begin construction of one or two vessels in the lag time between the completion of the final Collins and construction of the Hobart class DDG.

Left: The Collins class SSG

It seems the critical point that must be remembered is that sea control is a critical prerequisite for power projection[8]. The USN’s dogmatic adherence to littoral combat neglected investment in blue water capability; the ability to operate in the littoral environment is useless if you are challenged by an enemies attempt at a sea denial or sea control strategy out of the littorals. Sea control in blue water requires local superiority on, above and below the oceans, and that superiority is necessary for maritime forces to project power ashore. The ADF has apparently focused on only one element in the last ten years and missed an opportunity to significantly increase the RAN’s ability to dominate the other two. Although usually considered tools of a sea denial strategy, submarines can be extremely effective in a sea control strategy if used in conjunction with surface assets. The DDG-1000 could still have performed its littoral mission adequately if it had not been so heavily optimized for green water, the addition of proper blue water sonar, additional VLS and BMD capability would have allowed the US to continue with production of its next generation destroyer.

As we look towards our next round of procurement choices, such as the numbers of Hobart Class to be produced and the ANZAC and Collins class replacements, we must remember the lessons being learned at the moment. Procurement planners must look beyond the immediate strategic needs and not invest in heavily optimized platforms, in addition to making sure the platform choices match the strategic environment are designed to address. The question remains as to weather the lessons of twenty first century power projection have been learned.

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[1] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and issues for Congress: Page 3.

[2] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Page 2.

[3] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Page 4.

[4] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Summary

[5] CPRS Report for Congress, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs, Background, Oversight Issues and Options for Congress

[6] Australian Defence Business Review, Volume 25, July-August 2006, Page 18

[7] 2000 Defence White Paper, page 49

[8] Semaphore, Issue 9 2007, Royal Australian Navy

Air Power Australia, Flanker Analysis Examined

Unless you have stumbled across this blog by complete accident and are looking for financial commentary or a V8 page you’ve probably heard of Dr Carlo Kopp. Indeed he is perhaps the most famous, or infamous, analyst within the wider Australian defence community. The “good Dr” contributes to many respectable publications such as Defence Today Magazine on a regular basis, and often reports on a number of defence related issues which are in my opinion usually genuine and thoughtful articles. However his rather uncontroversial additions to various defence media are probably not the reason why you have heard of Dr Kopp. His most controversial articles and analysis all stem from the debate over the RAAF’s choice of combat aircraft and its viability when facing advanced Russian Flanker derivatives. His website “Air Power Australia” has flooded the internet with articles which invariably end with the conclusion on the outright inferiority of all western alternatives apart from the F-22A when facing the Super Flanker threat.

While the government went about considering tenders for an eventual replacement of the F/A-18C/D’s and F-111 fleet Dr Kopp and other associates (a Mr Goon included) lodged a submission to the DoD. Under Kopp’s plan the RAAF would acquire ~50 F-22A’s and retain 24 ‘upgraded’ F-111S’s. When this option was not chosen by the RAAF (the F-35 was chosen and then the F/A-18F as an interim solution) the Dr launched his PR campaign, arguing that only the F-22A could provide the RAAF with the necessary level of air dominance when facing the advanced Flanker threat. Soon the internet was flooded by APA PDF’s and his various pages on the APA site with long and seemingly comprehensive arguments illustrating the dire mistake the RAAF had made, and the inferiority of the chosen designs. To the layman (or even someone with a casual interest in air power) his arguments are very persuasive; indeed a younger, more impressionable Ozzy was swayed by the doctor’s conviction and apparent technical mastery. Debates on many forums included Kopp’s arguments, many of which had apparently not appeared before, it seemed that this Australian defence journalist had swayed thousands all over the world to his view of the contemporary battle space.

However after time, careful thought, significant discussion and a good dose of listening, reading and learning a slightly older, more sceptical Ozzy began to question the “good Dr’s” arguments and conclusions. Indeed it soon became apparent that Carlo Kopp’s work on contemporary air combat is, for the most part, an exercise in lobbying. After close examination it’s apparent that the vast majority of Dr Kopp’s arguments are based on mistruths, bogus analysis and conclusions drawn after only examining beneficial considerations. Below is the first section of a PDF authored by Dr Kopp available at his website, It is in many ways a typical piece of Kopp’s work which is why I decided to critically examine it. There was more to the piece but I could have gone on for ever; this two page article exemplifies Kopp’s major arguments and clearly illustrates the tactics and devices he uses to put together a persuasive and seemingly sound argument. Below I have outlined 16 major misrepresentations of fact, omissions, oversimplifications and deliberately partial analysis Kopp made on this 2 page journey in order to arrive at the damning conclusion that the F-35A or F/A-18F could at best, only hope to achieve parity when facing an advanced Flanker threat.

I have not altered the good doctor’s work outlined in blue below. The article full can be found here:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-BVR-AAM.html

Russian BVR Combat Philosophy

The Russian paradigm of BVR combat has its origins in the Cold War period, when Soviet operational analysis indicated that the low kill probability of missile seekers and airframes, especially if degraded by countermeasures, would be a major impediment to success. By the 1970s the standard Soviet technique in a BVR missile launch was to salvo two rounds, a semiactive radar homing weapon and a heatseeking weapon. To this effect some Soviet fighters even included a weapons select mode which automatically sequenced the launch of two rounds for optimal separation.

The mathematics of multiple round missile engagements are unambiguous - the size of a missile salvo launched is a stronger driver of success than the actual kill probability of the individual missiles. If the missiles are wholly identical by type, then the following curves may be optimistic, insofar as a factor degrading the kill probability of one missile is apt to have a similar effect on its siblings in a salvo. However, where the missiles differ by seeker type and guidance control laws, then the assumption of statistically independent missile shots is very much stronger.

A question often asked is why are Sukhoi Flanker variants equipped to carry between eight and twelve BVR missiles? The answer is a simple one - so they can fire more than one three or four round BVR missile salvo during the opening phases of an engagement. In this fashion the aircraft being targeted has a difficult problem as it must jam, decoy and/or outmanoeuvre three or four tightly spaced inbound missiles. Even if we assume a mediocre per round kill probability of 30 percent, a four round salvo still exceeds a total kill probability of 75 percent.

1) This all assumes the engagement occurs within the Flanker/R-27’s No Escape Zone/Volume which is unrealistic in most scenarios. The NEZ for an R-27ER vs. an F/A-18F with detection at launch would probably sit somewhere in the 30~40nm range mark, just over half of the stated maximum range of the R-27 and well under half of the AIM-120D’s maximum range. If the launch occurs outside this range then multiple launches will have no additional effect on the engagement, i.e. if the target can outrun one incoming then he can outrun 10.

A critical question which must be asked when assessing the effectiveness of Russian BVR tactics is that of Western tactics and the effectiveness of the AIM-120 AMRAAM, the principal Western BVR fighter weapon. The AIM-120A AMRAAM was introduced at the end of the Cold War to provide a "fire and forget" active radar guided weapon with a midcourse inertial guidance system and datalink support provided by the radar on the launch aircraft, allowing multiple concurrent shots. The AIM-120A was followed by the incrementally improved B-model, and then by the "short span" AIM-120C-3 sized to fit the F-22A weapon bay. The AIM-120C-4 has better kinematic performance introducing a larger rocket motor and shorter control section, and a better warhead, while the AIM-120C-6 introduced a better fuse. The latest AIM-120D introduces a redesigned seeker built for better durability in high vibration carriage environments, a two way datalink, GPS to supplement inertial guidance, incrementally improved kinematics, and better seeker performance against high off-boresight targets.

2) Kopp conveniently forgets to mention that the AIM-120D’s “multi burn” rocket motor has extended its maximum range to 100nm, 30nm greater reach than the R-27ER long burn. Additionally every stage in the AIM-120’s evolution has systematically improved its ECCM package, and even the AIM-120B included a home on jam feature rendering noise jamming (the type most widely used in the 90’s) obsolete.

The performance of the AIM-120A/B/C models in combat to date has not been spectacular. Test range trials have resulted in stated kill probabilities of 85 percent out of 214 launches for the AIM-120C variant. Combat statistics for all three variants are less stellar, amounting to, according to US sources, ten kills (including a friendly fire incident against a UH-60) of which six were genuine BVR shots, for the expenditure of just over a dozen AIM-120 rounds. The important parameter is that every single target was not equipped with a modern defensive electronic warfare package and therefore not representative of a state-of-the-art Flanker in a modern BVR engagement. Against such "soft" targets the AIM-120 has displayed a kill probability of less than 50 percent [1]. It is an open question whether the AIM-120D when challenged with a modern DRFM (Digital RF Memory) based monopulse trackbreaking jammer will be able to significantly exceed the 50 percent order of magnitude kill probability of prior combat launches, let alone replicate the 85 percent performance achieved in ideal test range conditions [2].

3) Here Dr Kopp mistakes average PK with an individual missile shot’s PK which is what is meant to be discussed here. An individual missile shot’s PK is utterly dependant on the details of the missile launch. These include range to target, altitude relative to target, energy state, target energy state, target bearing/angle of track, target ECM and the individual missiles ECCM. What this means in real terms is if an AIM-120D was fired at a supersonic MiG-21 at 90nm when the launch platform was in a low energy state and the target was fleeing the PK would be less than 5%. According to Kopp’s line of reason the AIM-120D must have a PK under 20%. Thus taking the total number of AIM-120 combat shots and taking the % of successes and then attempting to use those numbers as some sort of evidence for a particular missile shots probability of success is a fundamentally flawed line of logic in my opinion. In sub surface naval engagements, a low PK torpedo shot may be taken in order to facilitate a response from the enemy, such as to force him to come shallow or disrupt the enemies firing solution by compelling them to manoeuvre. The same stands for A2A engagements. Many A2A engagements in the 90’s occurred with western fighters defending strike packages, and escorting fighters may have made shots that had a low probability of success in order to defend the package. In short PK is not an arbitrary number, it’s wholly dependant on the circumstances of the launch. While some forms of SJP may have effected the PK of individual shots is not clear by any means that non state of the art SPJ’s would have had a significant effect considering the AMRAAM’s HOJ and ECCM package.

4) The AIM-120D has the most advanced ECCM package available on the BVR missile market to date. Modern DRFM deception jammers work by analysing the seekers pulse frequencies and then transmitting a similar signal in order to deceive the missile or reduce the seekers/FCR’s range through active cancellation. There are two fundamental vulnerabilities with this kind of technology. One is if you don’t understand the algorithms that govern the threat seekers actions and ECCM capability it may well be that the seeker will see the EM source attempting to jam it. The second is if that occurs then the SPJ acts like a beacon as the seeker just follows the EM source to the target. Thus deception jamming is extremely intel dependant, because if you don’t understand how the threat seeker works or how its “brain” thinks SPJ’s of this type can, in fact, be counter productive. The reality is even though this technology can be quite effective if it is more advanced than the seeker technology opposing it; it is far from the “panacea” portrayed by Kopp.

Where does this leave Western air forces equipped with the AIM-120 when confronting Flankers armed with up to three times the number of BVR missiles?

Illustrative examples are the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35 JSF, the latter armed in an air superiority configuration with two, the former with up to six AIM-120s [3]. Assuming the Flanker driver does not exploit his superior missile kinematic range and shoot first - an optimistic assumption - then the best case kill probability for the AIM-120 shooter firing two to four rounds is better than 90 percent. However, if we assume that hostile jamming and manoeuvre degrade the kill probability to around 50 percent - a reasonably optimistic statistical baseline here – then the total kill probability for a two round salvo is optimistically around 75 percent, and for a four round salvo over 90 percent. Arguably good odds for the four round salvo, only if the missile kill probability sits at 50 percent, but the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF will have expended all or most of its warload of AIM-120s and be unable to continue in BVR combat.

In a "many versus many" engagement, the low speed of both types leaves them unable to disengage and will see both types subsequently killed by another Flanker. This best case "many versus many" engagement scenario sees the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF being traded one for one with Su-30MK/Su-35BM Flankers in BVR combat, which is the general assumption made for WVR combat between like opponents, and representative of many historical attrition air campaign statistics. To achieve this best case "many versus many" outcome of trading F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF one for one, we have stacked a series of assumptions against the Flanker - dumb Flanker pilots not exploiting a missile kinematic range advantage, dumb Flanker pilots not exploiting a firepower advantage, Russian BVR missile seekers no better than the AIM-120, and Russian DRFM monopulse jammers achieving a less than 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability [4].

5) First let me address a clear misrepresentation of fact. The F/A-18F has 8 AMRAAM capable hard points. Additionally is has a dual rail launcher allowing the 6 underwing hard points to carry two each. Theoretically the platform could carry 14 AIM-120’s and 2 AIM-9X’s for a grand total of 16 missiles, significantly more than the SU-30. In real terms the two inboard hard points would likely be taken up by external fuel carriage, reducing the AMRAAM load to 10. 12 AAM’s is a realistic war load for the super hornet, though 10 is more typical (identical to a Flanker). At IOC the F-35A will be able to launch with 10 AMRAAM’s on 10 internal and external hard points if need be, and currently a dual rail, internal AMRAAM launcher is being developed under LM’s spiral development program which will allow 12; again comparable or better to a Flanker. In real terms there is no real advantage in a Flankers war load, and the Hornet/Lightning will be carrying weapons a full generation more advanced then their Russian adversaries.

Left and Right: F/A-18F with a 10 AAM missile load displaying the dual rail launcher, note that the outboard under-wing hard-points are not equipped with the dual rail launcher. Additionally the inboard under-wing hard-points are available for external fuel carriage making this an operational configuration.

6) The ability to achieve first shot is not dominated by kinematical performance in the vast majority of cases; information is the critical asset in this instance. The F/A-18F has significant RCS reduction in the frontal aspect, reducing its clean RCS to<.5m2 (likely .1m2). Even when carrying weapons the Rhino’s frontal RCS would be far smaller than a Flanker’s (SU-30’s frontal RCS is an estimated 4m2 + weapons). In real terms this will significantly reduce the flanker’s detection radius (although not to the level of VLO). Furthermore the F/A-18F is equipped with the AN/APG-79, LPI AESA radar. The exact detection and track performance of Irbis/BARS PESA and the APG-79 AESA radars are classified, but considering the generic performance bonuses AESA systems enjoy it is probable the AN/APG-79 provides better D&T performance. Additionally the LPI AESA’s random frequency modulation makes it extremely difficult to effectively jam; the system should enjoy much better ECCM performance than its Russian peers.

But even if the generationally inferior Russian radars enjoy comparable D&T performance the Rhino’s reduced RCS means it will detect the Flanker first. Furthermore the massive power output and single frequency use of the Russian super PESA’s means they will be detectable by the Rhino’s fully digital AN/ALR-67(v)3 RWR well outside said radars detection footprint. The combination of ESM/RWR detection, superior radar performance and smaller RCS ensures that in the vast majority of scenarios the Rhino will detect the Flanker first. First look is critical to enabling first shot (hence the term first look, first shot, first kill). Once you detect the threat without being counter detected the pilot can take the positional advantage or disengage at will, by achieving first look the Rhino enjoys the ability to prosecute the engagement on his own terms. Attaining positional advantage significantly increases the chances of a successful engagement; engaging the enemy while remaining undetected (outside of the threats radar footprint i.e. anywhere but in front of it) while in a high energy state and possibly from higher altitude will have devastating effects on the target.

Delaying the detection of the missile shot as long as possible increases the NEZ dramatically, gives the pilot less time to react and keeps end game energy high through lack of target evasion. First look has nothing to do with kinematical performance and everything to do with information dominance, the high ground in contemporary warfare and the dominating factor in modern BVR engagements. Considering the Super Hornet will most likely enjoy first look, and is equipped with BVR missiles that provide a 30% larger engagement envelope I think its reasonable to assume in most occasions the F/A-18F will achieve first shot, and again kinematic performance has little to do with it.

7) Flanker’s missiles are INFERIOR in terms of range performance. Longest ranging Russian missile equipping the flanker series in the foreseeable future is the R-27 Long Burn. This missile has a range maximum engagement envelope of 70nm (source Carlo Kopp). The F/A-18F on the other hand is equipped with the AIM-120D. That missile has a maximum engagement envelope of >100nm.

8) The F-35 is an LO platform with an RCS smaller than .001m2 (comparable to a golf ball or insect). Throughout the Flankers operational lifespan (and the foreseeable future) BVR engagements will be dominated by X band radars, just like those equipping the Flanker. Thus the Flanker will likely not have the ability to engage the F-35 in the BVR regime full stop, let alone achieve 1 for 1 kill rates in the 100km+ range (the F-35’s likely AIM-120D launch radius).

9) The R-77 is the Flankers primary active radar homing missile developed in the early 90’s, along with the R-27ER/EA which is in effect an R-27 missile body equipped with a long burn motor and the R-77’s seeker. The R-27ER/EA is the most potent missile in the Flankers inventory; however it enjoys identical seeker performance to the R-77. As we all know the driving force behind Russian weapons development in the post Cold War era has been the export market. Clearly the Russian arms manufactures have abandoned their previous qualms on exporting degraded or inferior Russian equipment. This is illustrated by the fact that the most capable Russian built fighters operational anywhere are flown by the Indian air force, and the export of top line Russian ASCM’s such as the “Sunburn”. Therefore it would be atypical for Russian manufacturers to have more advanced seeker technology in production and it not to be available on the open arms market. The R-77E (export model) has been available for export for over a decade, and according to Janes the seeker has had no major upgrades during that time, which would infer that the seeker technology used in the R-77E (and hence R-27ER/EA) is in fact 1990’s technology (comparable to the AIM-120A/B). The AIM-120’s seeker package has been upgraded 6 times in that timeframe, and the D model introduces features like a 2 way data-link which can transmit seeker generated data back to the launch platform. The seeker hardware must be significantly more sophisticated to allow this to occur. Thus it is clearly a reasonable assumption to state that the AIM-120D provides a more advanced seeker than the R-77E or R-27ER/EA.

A competent Flanker driver gets the first shot with three or four round salvo of long burn R-27 variants, with mixed seekers, leaving one or two remaining salvoes of BVR missiles on his rails, and the same Flanker driver will have modern DRFM monopulse jammers capable of causing likely much more than a 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability. With a thrust vectoring engine capability (TVC), the Flanker driver has the option of making himself into a very
difficult endgame target for the AIM-120 regardless of the capability of his jamming equipment.

10) As discussed earlier the Flanker is unlikely to get the first shot considering the advantages the Rhino enjoys in terms of information dominance. Kinematical performance will not enable first shot if the Rhino remains undetected by the Flanker. In any case a “first shot” is unlikely to be inside the NEZ and thus the 4 round salvo would not increase the PK.

11) The assumption that DRFM deception jamming technology will reduce an AIM-120D’s PK to less than 50% has no real world evidence or even balanced logic behind it. The previous discussion on PK was on average PK not specific missile shot PK and has nothing to do with determining a specific shot’s chances. Thus the below 50% PK on an AIM-120D is an imaginary number. Considering the generic disadvantages this technology has (unless you know the seeker hardware and software that govern the missile it is extremely difficult to effectively fool an advanced active seeker, and them the EM source will itself guide the missile) in most occasions 50% PK reduction is optimistic in my opinion. Even if that is the case the significantly inferior R-77E’s seeker must provide a far inferior PK.

12) TVC will have no positive effect on a platform’s chances of survival with an inbound BVR missile. TVC improves instantaneous turn rates which has a positive impact on WVR engagements, however when dodging a missile the system becomes counter-productive. TVC allows higher instantaneous turn rates (moves the nose around quicker) by diverting thrust; however this has the effect of bleeding airspeed and kinematic energy through increased drag and decreased thrust through axis of movement. Slowing down and thus putting yourself in a low energy state is effectively suicide when facing an incoming, 50g+ rated, BVR missile in a high energy state. It’s impossible to out turn a missile, TVC or not. The missiles Achilles heal is the fact that after the motor burns out (usually after a few dozen seconds) its bleeding energy, and if you can bleed enough energy out of the missile by keeping in a high energy state it is feasible to, in fact, make it impossible for the incoming to maintain the intercept track. The key is to reduce the missiles energy state as early and as much as possible, and TVC only hurts this process. In this situation TVC is a liability simply because it robes you of your greatest asset, energy. However “bleeding” incoming missiles is becoming less and less effective; Meteor and AIM-120D use motors that provide thrust throughout the flight profile (through Ramjet or multi-stage burn rocket motor) equating to high end game energy states.

Since all of the AIM-120s fired are identical in kinematic performance and seeker jam resistance, any measure applied by the Flanker driver which is effective against one AIM-120 round in the salvo is apt to produce the same effect against all AIM-120 rounds - a problem the Flanker driver does not have due to diversity in seeker types and missile kinematics.

13) The number game of missile exchange applies to AMRAAM’s in the same manner it does to Russian missiles. If an AMRAAM has a PK of 50% within the NEZ, 2 AIM-120’s will increase the PK to 75%. The superior seeker performance and ECCM more than makes up for the mixed bag of seekers employed in Russian doctrine (western fighters are also equipped with effective IRCM). Just because a DRFM SPJ is successful in fooling one missile does not increase its chances of repeating that success with the second. Realistically if a platform’s IRCM are as effective as its ECM and the process of employing both is relatively automated, and are not missile specific, mixed seeker incomings should not have any additional effect in terms of countermeasures. Kinematical difference is negligible considering in this scenario (within the NEZ) both of the incoming will be in a much higher energy state and can turn much tighter than the target (Russian or western), thus any difference is academic. In any case the Boeing Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile or JDRADM is the intended to replace the AIM-120D as the US’s primary BVR weapon. The JDRADM will incorporate IIR and Active Radar seeker technology providing a mixed seeker on every missile (enabling precision strike capability), the system should be operational within the next 5 to 10 years and deployed on F/A-18F’s and F-35’s.

Currently classified capabilities such as the use of the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar as an Xband high power jammer against the Russian BARS or Irbis E radar are not a panacea, and may actually hasten the demise of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF in a BVR shootout.This is for the simple reason that to jam the Russian radar, the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar must jam the frequencies being used by the Russian radar, and this then turns the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar into a wholly electronically predictable X-band high power beacon for an anti-radiation seeker equipped Russian BVR missile such as the R-27EP or R-77P. The act of jamming the Russian radar effectively surrenders the frequency hopping agility in the emissions of the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar, denying it the only defence it has against the anti-radiation missile. A smart Russian radar software designer will include a "seduction mode" to this effect, with narrowband emissions to make it very easy even for an early model 9B-1032 anti-radiation seeker. The flipside of the electronic combat game is no better. The F-14A/B/D included the AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track set which allowed a target to be tracked despite hostile jamming of the AWG-9/APG-71 radar. It is clear that the addition of the podded AAS-42 to the Super Hornet and "air to air" use of the JSF EOTS are intended for much the same purpose.

While this may permit the continuing use of the AESA radar to datalink midcourse guidance commands to the AIM-120s, it does nothing to deny the Flanker its own BVR shot. The notion that the defensive jamming equipment and infrared decoys will be highly effective against late model Russian digital missile seekers can only be regarded to be optimistic.

14) The extremely narrow and focused EM beam coupled with excellent side lobe performance that allow 3^rd gen AESA’s to be used as stand off jammers also mean that if the anti radiation missile is not within the boundaries of the beam itself it will likely not be able to detect the EM source (unlike DRFM deception SPJ’s which do not transmit on a single bearing). Thus unless the radar is attempting to jam the missile itself its range will be reduced dramatically. Contemporary BVR missiles achieve current range performance through using semi-ballistic flight profiles. Due to the limitations of line of sight, the AR AAM will have to behave like a beam rider, achieving comparable range performance to early, beam riding, variants of the AIM-7 (comparable in terms of size) thus leading to a maximum effective range in the 20~30nm ballpark. The exact effective range 3^rd gen AESA’s can effectively apply EA effects remains classified, however the USN stated that its effective range was “tactically significant” inferring comparable or greater range to a BVR missile max engagement envelope, or ~100nm. Thus in real terms the AR variant of the R-27 will have no effect on EA capability employed by the F/A-18F or F-35 unless said platforms are in near WVR. In real terms the capability is useless in the vast majority of the BVR regime.

Even within this “effective range” all the transmitting platform has to do is stop jamming the target for a matter of seconds and the incoming missile will lose lock. Once the missile looses the track it will not be able to manoeuvre with the target and when transmission resumes the missile will be out of its acquisition “basket” (i.e. the beam). The F/A-18F can then continue to apply EA effects on the target at will, disrupting comms and degrading radar performance. The only way AR variants of the R-77 or R-27 will be effective is if the transmitting platforms continue to jam the target right up until missile impact, indeed even if the missile is within a km or two and the target stops transmitting the shot is rendered useless. Against a fighter this weapons system has almost no chance of a kill due to the speed and manoeuvrability of the target and fleeting nature of the EM source. The best one can hope for is compelling the threat to cease applying EA on you for a matter of seconds.

15) Currently Russian designers have yet to produce a digital IIR missile seeker for the R-73 missile, which still relies on analogue rotating reticule technology last seen in the west on the AIM-9L/M. Due to the lack of international interest there is, to my knowledge, no major drive for digital IIR seekers on Russian BVR or WRV weapon system’s.

In electronic warfare terms neither side has a decisive advantage, but the Flanker does have a decisive advantage in aircraft and missile kinematics and in having up to six times the payload of BVR missiles to expend. The simple conclusion to be drawn is that operators of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF should make every effort to avoid Beyond Visual Range combat with late model Flankers, as the best case outcome is parity in exchange rates, and the worst case outcome a decisive exchange ratio advantage to the Flanker. Given the evident design choices the Russians have made, this is not an accident, but rather a consequence of well thought through operational analysis of capabilities and limitations of contemporary BVR weapon systems.

16) The ability to apply EA effects at stand off range is currently an ability that the Flanker does not enjoy, and will not, ever (the last production Flanker, the SU-35BM, is equipped with the Irbis PESA radar and its likely that the first Russian platform to field an advanced AESA capable of EA will be the T-50 PAK FA), the F/A-18F and F-35A do however. Additionally the ECCM employed by 3^rd gen AESA’s are significantly more advanced then their Russian peers. The random frequency modulation employed by LPI AESA’s make them virtually impossible to jam through active cancellation and deception simply because it is impossible to predict the next frequency the AESA will use on any number of its beams (i.e. its random). In order to effectively jam the LPI AESA with deception or active cancellation techniques the SPJ or EA source would have to transmit on as many as a thousand specific frequencies which have ben chosen at random by the Radar, i.e. basically impossible. The only form of ECM that has any effect on 3^rd gen AESA’s is 80’s vintage noise jamming, because it transmits loudly on all frequencies throughout the band. This form of ECM has virtually been rendered obsolete by the increased D&T performance of FCR’s (increased burn-through capability) and the HOJ capability provided by many contemporary BVR weapons. The AN/ALR-679(v)3 is a fully digital RWR currently deployed on the F/A-18F, it’s half a generation ahead of current gen (analogue) Flanker RWR. Presently Russian digital RWR technology is still in the developmental stage. Clearly in every area of EW, ECM, ECCM & ELINT the F/A-18F & F-35A hold a distinct advantage.

This conclusion is typical of the tactics, techniques and devices Kopp uses to argue his case. The premises of many of the conclusions stated on the final paragraph are built on arguments made previously under false logic (such as using average PK to determine specific PK) or flat out falsification (such as the inferior war load). Using the faulty or misleading arguments outlined in previous paragraphs, each sprinkled with real capability and fact to increase the feeling of legitimacy, to arrive at the desired conclusion can be very convincing. Hence we must examine the whole article in order to dismantle the conclusion.

How did Dr Kopp reach the conclusions of a best case parity exchange ratio without examining the effect of information dominance and networking on the engagement? The primacy of ISR capability and information distribution has been clearly illustrated in every high intensity conflict fought by the west in the post cold war era. Surely the impact of VLO should be considered before making such damning conclusions? Rendering threat radar performance practically irrelevant should be worth consideration shouldn’t it, particularly considering X band radars dominate BVR engagements? Not once was the effect of RCS reduction addressed in the whole article. On three or four occasions Kopp examines an engagement that is clearly 4^th gen platforms manoeuvring within the others radar footprint, and then lumps the F-35 in the conclusion even though VLO renders the previous comparison utterly moot.

In fact how is a Flanker going to achieve a 1 to 1 exchange ratio with an F-35 when it lacks the ability to effectively engage or track the platform with its primary sensor at BVR? Oh, that’s right the IRST! Yet another conclusion drawn from a previous argument based on misleading information and half truths. Not even western designers have achieved performance even close to AESA radars with IIR technology, and even Dr Kopp admits the Russians are yet to field systems as advanced as operational western designs (the developmental OLS on the MiG-35 is the only Russian system comparable to current gen western technology like PIRATE). The critical factor with IRST technology is it can not effectively search a large volume in the same manner as a Radar, its akin to searching for an aircraft in the sky with a pair of binoculars when you don’t know its there and you cant hear it. Even if technically an IRST can detect an afterburning F-35 at 50 or 100km, without another sensor cueing the IRST (like if you heard the aircraft or someone else told you to look with your binoculars) its chances are one in a million. Even if the IRST does acquire the F-35 it can not effectively track the target (IRST’s can not generate range information and thus a track) and relies on a laser range finder. The only feasible way for an IRST to track a VLO target is if it is cued by an RWR/ESM, which is difficult considering all F-35’s comms and active sensors are LPI, and in combat many will have stringent EMCON procedures applied (i.e. probably EM Cold receiving sensor information from other platforms). In short the F-35 equipped force will have a near clear picture of the battle space, and the Flanker equipped force will have nothing of the sort i.e. wont be able to detect or track the threat platforms with supporting ISR platforms or fighter Fire Control Radars. Anyone who has an objective viewpoint and has examined the effect on information dominance on modern air campaigns (including desert storm) should come to the conclusion that a 1 for 1 exchange ratio is extremely optimistic for the Flanker equipped force.

Over and over again Kopp presents opinion as fact and the authority the average reader grants the writer allows him to effectively do so, often without question. He continually uses prior conclusions as evidence, however those prior conclusions are invariably built on analysis that either deliberately omits vital elements or blatantly falsifies information. In effect Kopp has constructed a house of cards with specious analysis and conclusion using prior specious analysis and falsehood as its foundation, which like any house of cards collapses if one critically examines the assumptions and claims that hold the entire argument together. Someone who continually needs to resort to such tactics to argue his case must have a serious personal interest in being seen to be correct (even if in reality he is not) that goes far beyond pride or patriotic interest. Indeed the systematic way Dr Kopp builds artificial conclusions on spurious analysis and distortion indicates a malicious intention to mislead the reader rather than stimulate thought and genuine debate.

Resources:

http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw000904_5_n.shtml

http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jalw/jalw3025.html

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-BVR-AAM.html

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/218m-for-new-aim120d-amraam-lead-materials-02249/